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Transportation
ABSTRACT
Shipping containers have been under increased scrutiny in recent years for
two primary reasons. Within the private sector, they are one component of a
continuing process by organizations to use effective supply chain management to
their competitive advantage. Within the public sector, they are the central focus of a
growing concern over cargo security. Indeed, these issues involve many parties,
including regulators, carriers, shippers, container solution providers, research, and
academia. Many of the proposed solutions involve new strategies, systems, and
technologies applied to containers that fall into what this paper calls the "intelligent
container concept." As a relatively nascent field, information is currently very
fragmented, standards are still being researched, and few universal goals exist. This
study is focused on compiling, understanding, and organizing the universe of options
available, the concerns of the parties involved, the relevant and significant initiatives
underway or completed, and the issues surrounding implementation. While cost and
technology are critical components of the debate, this study focuses more on the
benefits that the proposed solutions might add and how they can be incorporated
into the supply chain. This study is intended to familiarize the reader with the status
and extent of the intelligent container field, though does not delve into the cost or
technology issues since they vary greatly and are supply chain specific.
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BACKGROUND NOMENCLATURE
RELEVANT BODIES AND REGULATIONS
AMR Advanced Manifest Rule (24-hour rule): a CBP initiative (part of the
ATDI) requiring advanced submittal of cargo manifest data
AMS Automated Manifest System: systems to electronically submit
manifest declarations to DHS
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Community: an economic forum group of
countries bordered along the Pacific Ocean
ATDI Advanced Trade Data Initiative: a CBP request that cargo manifests
be sent in advance of arrival to the US The 24-hour rule is part of
this initiative.
ATS Automated Targeting System: a system implemented by DHS to
assess the risk of incoming containers
CBP Customs and Border Protection: a national agency that maintains
control over the importation and exportation of goods into a
country; unless otherwise specified, refers to US in this report; US
CBP is part of US DHS
CSD Container Security Device: although used as a general term typically
to describe an ICC that is somewhat more complex and an e-seal,
"CSD", or "Advanced CSD" (ACSD), actually refers to a DHS
initiative intended to make a container more secure
CSI Container Security Initiative: a DHS-initiated program that places US
inspectors in foreign ports and works cooperatively to scan US-
bound containers before they leave port
C-TPAT Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: a DHS-initiated
program to "validate" players in supply chains as having
developed an approved security plan; in return, CBP intends to
provide expedited handling and reduced inspection
DHS Department of Homeland Security: a US executive federal
department that is responsible for security within the borders,
both physical and virtual, of the United States
ILWU International Longshore and Warehouse Union: a labor union that
represents longshore and warehouse workers in the US and
Canada
IMO International Maritime Organization: a division of the United Nations
that oversees the safety and security international maritime
affairs
ISPS International Ship and Port Security Code: an IMO regulation, which
is part of Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), that provides general
requirements for security relating to ships and ports, to be
implemented and interpreted by each signing nation
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MATTS
TSA
TWIC
USCG
WCO
WSC
RELEVANT
JIT
SCM
SKU
RELEVANT
EDI
EPC
GPS
RFID
SKU
Marine Asset Tag Tracking System: a DHS initiative to develop a
"Future Smart Container"
Transportation Security Administration: a division of DHS
responsible for securing transportation systems, including
highways, railroads, buses, mass transit, sea and airports
Transportation Worker Identification Credential: a TSA-initiated
program to develop and implement background checks for all
unescorted workers in seaports
US Coast Guard: a division of DHS responsible for the safety and
security of maritime activities
World Customs Organization: an independent non-profit
organization comprised of member nations throughout the world
World Shipping Council: A consortium of ocean carriers that provides
a single voice for the industry.
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS
Just-In-Time: an SCM philosophy that maintains very low inventories
as parts are delivered "just in time" for use
Supply Chain Management: the process of planning, implementing,
and controlling the flow of goods with the purpose of satisfying
customer requirements as efficiently as possible
Stock Keeping Unit: a number describing one item maintained in
stock (could refer to both an individual part in a retail store or box
full of parts in a warehouse, depending on the stocking situation)
TECHNOLOGY
Electronic Data Interchange: a standard electronic format with which
to exchange cargo data and business information
Electronic Product Code: an RFID-based collection of coding schemes
created as an eventual successor to product bar codes
Global Positioning System: a satellite based system that provides
realtime global location tracking
Radio Frequency IDentification: a radio-frequency based
communication method that provides remote identification of a
tag within the reader's region
Stock Keeping Unit: an index used by merchants to identify
individual goods or services
13
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1PURPOSE AND MOTIVATION
The purpose of this study is to identify, organize, and assess the universe of
intelligent container concepts (ICCs) available today by taking an approach focused
on value-added to the supply chain. ICCs are defined in this report to include any
process, system, or modification to a conventional shipping container that can be
used to either provide additional information about or control some characteristic of
a the container or its cargo.
This study is deemed valuable since a significant literature review has not
produced any similar study as comprehensive. Instead, most efforts to date focus
either on the technological complications of ICCs or look at one particular
application of a technology, commonly RFID and security. Therefore, a need was
seen to capture and classify the current universe of ICC drivers, issues, and
initiatives. This approach should aid a supply chain professional to better understand
and make general decisions about ICC implementation before attempting a more
specific analysis for his/her specific supply chain.
An important opening disclaimer is the recognition that ICCs are not viewed
in this study as a panacea or turnkey solution. It is clearly recognized and respected
that an ICC must support the supply chain's ultimate goal as established by the
corporate strategies of all parties involved. Further, implementation of an ICC is
unlikely to be effective unless (1) it is well understood and accepted by the various
parties in the supply chain and (2) all necessary changes needed to fully realize the
benefits that the ICC may provide are made. Therefore, while ICCs may be the
catalyst for a system-wide upgrade, they are not likely to be the entire solution. This
point is raised throughout the study and also discussed in greater detail in 5.1 ICCS
AS A SUPPLY CHAIN COMPONENT.
1.2SCOPE
This study is intended to document and categorize the ICC industry with a
particular focus on how ICCs may add value to the supply chain. Since the study
covers no specific ICC or supply chain, discussion is necessarily qualitative with
limited effort made to address cost or technological concerns. Although these issues
are critical to analyze any actual implementation, they vary greatly depending on
each initiative, and are therefore reserved for application-specific studies.
Key follow up questions for a supply chain professional reading this study
might be, "what is the monetary value of these benefits to my supply chain, what is
the state of the technology, how do the regulations discussed affect my supply
chain, and what costs exist?"
14
1.30BJECTIVES
The specific objectives of this study are to:
1. Establish an appropriate definition for ICCs.
2. Consider general supply chain issues and existing methods, then infer how
ICCs might affect them.
3. Understand the universe of intelligent container concepts and develop a
taxonomy for it. Include such items as affected parties, regulatory drivers,
technical capabilities, initiatives underway, industry opinion, and
implementation issues.
1.3.1 Tasks to fulfill objectives
To fulfill the stated objectives, the following tasks are to be completed:
1. Conduct a literature review on concepts relating to intelligent containers,
security and regulatory issues, supply chain management issues, conveyance
tracking, technology and cost issues, etc.
2. Organize the research data to understand the state of the field and major
issues confronting it.
3. Develop a taxonomy for the different issues and establish commonality when
appropriate.
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2. INTELLIGENT CONTAINER CONCEPT (ICC) PRIMER
2.1DEFINITION
The "intelligent container concept," or ICC, in this report refers to any
method, technology, or system used to monitor or control some characteristic of a
shipping container or its cargo in order to provide additional information to parties
in the supply chain.
2.2TAXONOMY
Since this is a nascent and developing subject area, this study first attempts
to classify the ICC universe by using different common key qualifiers. Note that there
are varying degrees of overlap in these categories.
2.2.1 By proposed benefit
ICCs are of interest because of the potential benefits they may provide.
These benefits are broadly broken into two main categories: Supply Chain
Management and Security and Safety.
Supply chain management
o Custodial transfer declaration and customs manifesting:
automatically declare the arrival of a container for both the port
at which the transfer occurs and customs clearance
o Container and cargo tracking: track containers either on a
realtime/near realtime basis, or when intermodal transfers occur
" Improve supply chain information prevalence and quality:
automated processes tend to increase the amount and
improve the quality of data available
" Cargo-centric approach: consider the container as the key
item in supply chain, rather than focusing on each mode;
this may help improve communication among parties
("join the silos")
" Supply chain resilience: rapidly respond to supply chain
disruptions (equipment failure, terrorism, labor strike,
etc.) or locate container while in transit if re-routing or
intentional delay is desired
" Supply chain streamlining: improved information on
tracking allows shipping managers more flexibility to make
better decisions; long term planning methods increasingly
rely on supply chain visibility; carriers may also be able to
improve container utilization
o High-density container area management for custodian:
inventory, manage, and quickly find containers in high-density
container areas such as a seaport, railyard, onboard a ship, or on a
16
train; additionally, if containers can bounce signals off of each
other (multi-hop), then a connection with one container might be
adequate to fully scan a ship or port's inventory
o Dray-specific applications: applications of ICCs that satisfy needs
unique to the road carrier industry
" Pay tolls: automatically pay tolls, or at least provide
verification of toll costs to shipper
" Pay interstate trucking taxes: monitor distance travelled by
a truck for paying state trucking taxes
" Asset tracking (chassis, tractor, trailers): track the location
of assets to manage fleets and improve utilization
" Certification: certifications of container weight (for road
limits) and CBP inspection can be indicated on the ICC for
quick scanning during the remainder of the voyage
o Quality control: monitor container conditions relevant to cargo
needs, for example temperature, humidity, accelerometer
(impact, tilt, vibration), and air quality
" Rapid response: with constant monitoring, if container
contents are found to be lost or ruined, a replacement
order may be placed quickly
" Liability: if a problem is detected that is attributable to the
custodian, the ICC may establish to whose custody that
liability belongs
Security and safety
o Container integrity
" Seals (container doors)
* Manual seal: either a soft seal that breaks when
the door is opened (to indicate break in) or a hard
seal intended to lock the container door
" Electronic seal: an "electronic seal" that can
provide the same capability as a manual seal
though can perform additional tasks: log door
opening, permit legitimate entrances (i.e. customs
inspection), immediately alert appropriate parties
on event
" Remote lock/unlock: remotely lock or unlock the
container door
" Detection sensors (container sides and interior)
* Detect unauthorized container breach: sensors
intended to detect a container breach from any of
the six sides (i.e. light, humidity, infrared sensors)
" Verify container contents: sense dangerous
materials (i.e. radiological, chemical, biological,
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etc.) in self and/or around container; also if x-ray
scanned container at the port of departure, carry a
copy of the scan image on the ICC so that an X-ray
in the receiving port can verify that contents have
not been changed
* Tamper sensor: detect tampering with sensor
system
o Container and cargo tagging and tracking: benefits for tagging and
tracking that have security benefits (as opposed to those listed in
the Supply Chain Management section above)
" Quickly locate container: find specific container in the
supply chain if it needs to be inspected
- Geo-fencing/route adherence: establish geographic bands
within which the container is expected to travel; send alert
if container leaves those bands
" Proximity to custodian/handlers: ensure that container
remains in proximity to custodian
o Safety
" Local warnings to handlers: list warnings about unsafe
contents and their Material Safety Data Sheets both
physically and electronically
" Container incompatibility: container cargoes, particularly
in tank containers, may be dangerous if mixed with
contents of other containers, making them
"incompatible"; ensure that these containers do not come
in close contact
" Container conditions: ensure that a toxic cargo is not
leaking out of its inner containment into the shipping
container, prevent overheating of flammable material, etc.
" Emergency response: if emergency exists, quickly respond
(problem known, location known, etc.); include emergency
call buttons for trucks
" Environmental risk reduction: sense leaks to alert
custodian and authorities
2.2.2 By communication protocol
There are several common methods by which ICCs communicate, though
they are not mutually exclusive.
* Passive: a powerless ICC that is only read when a reader checks it
" Active: a powered ICC that can send out a signal
o Continuous: an ICC that updates the reader regularly at some set
time interval
18
00
o Alert: an ICC that only sends a signal when some measured quality
(i.e. temperature) falls outside of a pre-determined range
o Ping-only: an ICC that communicates only when pinged by a
reader
Data carriage: the ability to carry data about the container
Multi-hop: the ability of ICCs to recognize one another, "hopping" the
signal
o Single point-of-contact: a stack of containers, which can be very
difficult and time consuming to survey, can quickly be pinged to
find a specific container
o Proximity recognition: ICCs that recognize one another may be
able to provide aggregate data (total weight of a stack of
containers), warn against incompatibility issues (unsafe
neighboring chemical storage), etc.
* Readable/writable: some ICCs can only be written to once (readable),
while others can be re-written indefinitely (writable)
2.2.3 By technology
Some common technologies for ICCs are:
" Inherently local (terrestrial)
o Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
" Passive
" Active
o SmartCards
o Wireless sensor networks
" Inherently global (satellite)
o Global Positioning System (GPS)
o Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM)
Note that "inherently local" technologies may be made global by adding a
local communication port with satellite access.
2.2.4 By stakeholders and beneficiaries
There are certain stakeholder groups within a supply chain that would either
benefit from or at least have interest in ICCs. Some of the most common are:
* Cargo
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
custodians
Ocean carrier
Air carrier
Rail carrier
Truck carrier
Seaport
Airport
Railyard
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o Transload facility
o Warehouse/distribution center
" Shipper type
o Retail
o Grocer
o Pharmaceutical
o Manufacturing
o HazMat/chemicals
o Military
" Regulatory
o Customs
o Homeland security/border patrol
" Industry bodies/consortiums
" Technology providers
o Legacy providers with existing industry penetration
o Smaller start-ups with high technology
o Conglomerates already providing other services to the industry
and looking for a new market
2.2.5 By level of implementation
Although this study focuses primarily on containers, depending on their
goals, many parties are interested in other levels of implementation:
" Conveyance: the custodian's equipment for moving the container (i.e. a
chassis, trailer, rail car, etc.)
" Container: the shipping container
" Pallet: a collection of multi-packs or parts bundled on a pallet, typically
about 4'x4' and of wood construction
" Multi-pack: a carton (typically cardboard box) containing multiple parts
* Part/SKU: the individual item of interest being shipped
20
3. ICC STAKEHOLDER BACKGROUNDS AND INITIATIVES
Stakeholders in the ICC debate include parties concerned with (1) supply
chain management, (2) the container industry, and (3) the development of ICCs. This
chapter outlines these stakeholders to prepare for discussions of why ICCs may be of
interest to each. The stakeholders discussed are:
" Regulatory bodies
" Carriers and logistics providers
* Shippers
* ICC technology and service providers
" Consortium study groups
" Academia and research
Each section is divided into two main parts: Background, which discusses the
stakeholder group and its primary issues; and Initiatives, which discusses some
primary ICC initiatives by that stakeholder group.
Note that while the level of tracking of greatest interest for this study was
the container, five main levels are considered in the industry: conveyance,
container, pallet, multi-pack, and part. Generally, conveyance tracking is included in
this study, while pallet level and lower are not. This is because conveyance tracking
may indirectly track containers (tracking a ship could effectively track the containers
aboard as well), while lower tracking levels are not likely to support container
tracking, and in fact may require support from the container to operate anyhow.
A summary of the discussed initiatives is provided in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
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This sum mary is based on best information
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3.1REGULATORY BODIES
3.1.1 Background
Regulatory bodies exist at local, regional, national, and international levels.
Different regulators have different concerns, though in the context of cargo
movements, most are focused on the safety and security of people and property
within its jurisdiction.
3.1.1.1 US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS)/US Customs and Border
Protection (US CBP)
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as some of its
subsidiary departments, most notably US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), has
worked heavily in the area of cargo security. The efforts of these organizations was
summed into a list of significant initiatives by (Meyer and Meyer 2005), (Trade
2006), and (Secure 2005):
" Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
" Container Security Initiative (CSI)
* Advanced Trade Data Initiative (24-hour rule)
" Advanced Targeting System (ATS)
" Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
* Non-intrusive inspections (NIl)
" Free And Secure Trade (FAST)
* Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD, "SmartBox")
3.1.1.1.1 Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a partnership
between the US CBP and the private sector to ensure that all parties in a C-TPAT
compliant supply chain meet certain security standards set forth by CBP. In return
for compliance, cargo from these facilities is considered less risky, which is supposed
to reduce inspections to both expedite shipping and relieve the burden on CBP
inspectors.
US CBP describes C-TPAT as "a voluntary government-business initiative to
build cooperative relationships ... through close cooperation with the ultimate
owners of the international supply chain such as importers, carriers, consolidators,
licensed customs brokers, and manufacturers. [C-TPAT asks] businesses to ensure
the integrity of their security practices and communicate and verify the security
guidelines of their business partners within the supply chain." (CTPAT 2006)
US CBP also describes the benefits and success of the program: "Participants
receive expedited processing of C-TPAT shipments to C-TPAT partners. (Trade
2006)." Expedited shipping is a result of: fewer inspections for inbound cargo,
"green lanes" to move C-TPAT cargo through a port ahead of non-C-TPAT cargo,
"restart priority" in the event of port closure, and paperless data exchange by
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increasing electronic manifesting (Downey 2006). In favor of ICCs, (Kulisch 2006)
suggests that sensors are seen as a best-practice for implementing green lanes,
which should reduce overall port congestion.
The World Shipping Council (WSC), which represents the world's largest
containership companies, states that the ocean carriers support C-TPAT, and added
that industry believes that non-intrusive scanning at foreign ports is the most
important tool for regular checks. (In-Transit 2003)
Some large shippers have also expressed their support for C-TPAT. (Downey
2006) states that "Procter & Gamble (P&G), Boeing, Starbucks, and Kmart
emphasized that [signing up for C-TPAT] makes good business sense. In addition to
the 'moral obligation' to secure cargo ... there [is a] need to 'protect the brand."' Tim
Armstrong, senior director of domestic transportation and logistics services for
Anheuser-Busch (A-B), also showed shipper support for C-TPAT. Armstrong stated
that A-B regards C-TPAT participation as "both good citizenship and good business.
As we add imported beers ... to our distribution system, it's important that we avoid
shipment delays and deliver fresh beer to our customers." (Melcer and Tsadik 2006)
Container Security Inc. claimed that C-TPAT could bring savings of $300 per
container for faster cargo movement, plus avoidance of inspection which adds
$1000 in savings
Still, the rate of implementation is tough to determine. Although CBP claims
that 10,000 have participated, (Downey 2006) puts that number into perspective by
stating that, as of February 2006, only about 4,000 of the roughly 50,000 importers
had adopted C-TPAT. Further, at that time, of all of the claimed C-TPAT benefits,
only reduced inspections had been observed and recorded. Costs are also inevitable,
and must ultimately be weighed against benefits. C-TPAT is claimed to have already
cost Canadian carriers about $400 million in upgrades (Downey 2006).
3.1.1.1.2 Container Security Initiative (CSI)
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) authorizes the US CBP to station
inspectors at foreign ports that send cargo to the US. These inspectors can assess
cargo risk (Beisecker 2006) and prevent the smuggling of terrorists and weapons.
This initiative is intended to address the realization that scanning a container once it
reaches a US port may be too late to prevent a disaster. Presently there are 41
participating ports, which (Stana 2006) claims accounts for about 73% of US-bound
containers.
CBP claims that the CSI's intent is to identify and inspect all containers that
pose a potential terrorist risk at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels.
Teams of US officers from both CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) work with foreign counterparts to target and prescreen containers, as well as
develop leads regarding a terrorist threat to cargo. (CSI 2006)
CBP claims that CSI's four elements are to (CSI 2006):
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" Identify high-risk containers using automated targeting tools based on
advance information and strategic intelligence
" Prescreen and evaluate containers as early in the supply chain as
possible, always before being shipped, generally at the port of departure
" Use technology to prescreen high-risk containers which ensures rapid
physical screening; technology includes large-scale X-ray and gamma ray
machines and radiation detection devices
" Use smarter, more secure containers to allow US-based CBP officers to
identify containers that have been tampered with during transit
The World Shipping Council supports CSI (In-Transit 2003).
3.1.1.1.3 Advanced Trade Data Initiative (ATDI)/Automated Targeting System
(A TS)/24-hr Advanced Manifest Rule (24-hour rule)
The Advanced Trade Data Initiative (ATDI), Automated Targeting System
(ATS), and 24-hr Advanced Manifest Rule (AMR) all refer to parts of a system in place
that assesses risk to containers based upon various data.
The ATDI is an umbrella initiative that ultimately developed the more-
commonly known 24-hour rule. This rule requires all importing carriers to submit a
cargo declaration to US CBP 24-hours before cargo is loaded onto a vessel with a
port of call in the US. This information allows CBP to designate a "load/do not load"
status to each container before it has been placed aboard the ship (Maersk 2006).
The policy affects all containers, including those from CSI ports (Panagopoulos
2007). Since it is a national effort, a container on a ship visiting several US ports
before its final destination may be scanned in an earlier port, for example a
container moving on a ship through Boston could be scanned there before finally
arriving in NYC or Savannah (Vikesland 2006).
Risk is assessed by the Automatic Targeting System (ATS) at the National
Targeting Center (NTC) in Virginia (Trade 2006). Fundamentally, ATS provides a
system with which to significantly reduce the amount of physical cargo screening
that is needed. This is seen to be absolutely critical to ensure that ports are not
brought to a halt trying to screen all cargo. Several studies have focused heavily on
why 100% cargo screening is said to be infeasible, and (Cirincione and Cosmas 2006)
offers five main reasons why:
* Ambiguity of 100% cargo scanning policies
" Technology limitations
" Cost
" Logistical difficulties
* Stakeholder support
Therefore, the ATS assessment issues containers a score that reduces the
number of containers physically inspected by limiting scanning to those that are
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high-risk. The information used to develop that score includes (Automated Targeting
2006):
" Sea/Rail/Air Manifests (Automated Manifest System/AMS-Air)
* Truck Manifest, Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)
* Cargo Selectivity Entries (Automated Broker Interface)
* Express Consignment Services (bills of lading)
" CCRA Manifest (bills of ladings), Canada Customs and Revenue (CCRA)
* CAFE, QP Manifest Inbound (bills of ladings), AMS
* Inbound Data (bills of ladings), AMS
* Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Entries/Prior Notice (PN),
Automated Commercial System (ACS)
" Census Import Data, Department of Commerce
The World Shipping Council openly "understands and accepts the strategy of
cargo risk assessment and targeting (Comments 2006)," and therefore supports the
24-hour rule (In-Transit 2003). (Lake and Robinson 2005), a report written for the US
Congress, also supports the notion. It states, "the key to success [of facilitating trade
while interdicting malicious cargo] is the ability to accurately and efficiently identify
high-risk passengers and cargo, target them for inspection, and prevent entry."
Some sources are critical of ATS in its current state. A GAO audit (Stana 2006)
mentioned various shortcomings:
" CBP had not yet put adequate controls in place to ensure the
effectiveness of the ATS [ (van de Voort and O'Brien 2003) supports this
idea by suggesting that random checks should be used as a benchmark to
determine the effectiveness of ATS]
" The system is not refined enough to analyze information learned from
routine inspections and implement it in future inspections, but instead
only reads data from different, unconnected databases
(Cirincione and Cosmas 2006) also comments on the ATS:
* CBP has no means to guarantee manifest authenticity
" Ship manifests are often an inaccurate record of cargo contents, even
when authentic
" "According to GAO, ATS not been proven to be any better than selecting
containers at random"
Finally, (Flynn 2004) notes that DHS does not gather information itself, rather
only analyzes it, and therefore cannot control what it obtains.
3.1.1.1.4 Other initiatives
* Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC): a program
initiated jointly by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
the USCG that requires workers that are unescorted in maritime facilities
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to have a TWIC card (TSA: Transportation 2007). Acquiring a TWIC card
requires a full background check on personal data, fingerprints, and, if
applicable, job and employer (Transportation Worker 2006).
" Non-intrusive inspections (NIl): a container scan that uses non-intrusive
technologies; these include radiation portal monitors, personal radiation
detectors, radiation isotope identifiers, and large-scale X-ray and gamma-
ray imaging systems
" Free And Secure Trade (FAST): expedites US/Canada and US/Mexico
cargo moving between partnering C-TPAT compatible importers
" SmartBox: a public/private partnership that is discussed in 3.1.2.1
Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD/CSD)/SmartBox
3.1.1.2 US Coast Guard (USCG)
The US Coast Guard focuses on maritime matters, mainly safety and security,
for the US government. USCG has five primary "missions":
" Maritime Safety
" Maritime Security
" Maritime Mobility
* National Defense
* Protection of Natural Resources (Coast 2006)
The USCG, which is a peer to the US CBP under the US DHS, supports CBP
activities that deal with ships and maritime security.
3.1.1.3 World Customs Organization (WCO)
The World Customs Organization (WCO) is an international organization that
represents 171 member countries' customs administrations accounting for 97% of
all global trade (Trade 2006). The WCO, in close collaboration with the US and other
customs agencies, created the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate
Global Trade (Framework).
The Framework was developed concurrently with US regulations, and
therefore is quite similar in several regards. The "international equivalent" of some
of the key US regulations listed above is evident in the four principles behind the
Framework (Beisecker 2006):
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Table 1. US CBP and WCO Framework parallel regulations
US CBP Regulation WCO Framework equivalent
The Customs and Trade Partnership providing benefits to businesses
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) (designated as "Authorized Economic
Operators") that agree to minimal
standards for supply chain security.
These benefits include faster processing
of goods at borders and reduced
examination rates
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) requiring exporting countries to agree to
perform inspections, preferably through
non-intrusive detection equipment (i.e.
x-rays, gamma ray detectors) at the
reasonable request of importing
countries
The 24 Hour Advance Manifest Rule harmonizing advance electronic
manifests and reducing complex
reporting procedures
The Automated Targeting System (ATS) using risk management approaches to
target suspect shipments
The World Shipping Council supports WCO's Framework (In-Transit 2003).
3.1.1.4 European Union (EU)
The European Union amended its Customs Security Program with the
Community Customs Code in 2005. The amendments added were (Supply Chain
Security EU 2006):
" require traders to provide customs authorities with information on goods
prior to import to or export from the European Union
" provide reliable traders with trade facilitation measures [Authorized
Economic Operator (AEO)]
* introduce a mechanism for setting uniform Community risk-selection
criteria for controls, supported by computerized systems.
These amendments intentionally closely mirror those of the WCO's
Framework (EUROPA 2006).
As part of their increasing security standards, ports must also now be able to
account for all cargo, an application for which Michael Lux, head of the European
Commission's customs legislation unit, suggested that electronic tracking could be
helpful. (Possible 2004)
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3.1.1.5 International Maritime Organization (IMO)
The IMO, which has historically focused mostly on maritime safety, has
implemented the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code that establishes
minimum-security standards for ports and ocean vessels (Secure 2005). The code
requires certain plans and procedures to be developed for ships and ports intended
to enhance security of both, including their crews and cargos. The code is
intentionally written at a high-level to allow member governments to clarify how the
guidelines are to be met, which is understandable since they are also responsible for
enforcing the regulations. (International Ship 2002) Therefore, any regulation
coming from US CBP or USCG will probably be at least as stringent as IMO
regulations.
3.1.2 Initiatives
3.1.2.1 Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD/CSD)/SmartBox
Proiect Lead: US DHS
Partners: Savi Technology (Savi Networks, Lockheed Martin
Corporation), GE, and several others responded by
developing technology
Tagging Level: Container
Both CSD and ACSD are used as general terms, though they refer to a specific
initiative put forth by DHS's Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA). The CSD
initiative is intended to develop methods to make containers secure. The ACSD
research awards from HSARPA ranged in technology from removable intrusion
detection devices to composite material containers with electronic monitoring
inherent in the material (HSARPA 2006).
The CSD project lays out several requirements for the device, such as sensing
capabilities, alert methods, data storage, communication procedures, physical
interface requirements, and operational considerations (Request 2006). The effort
began in January 2004, when CBP partnered with four C-TPAT importers to
incorporate a CSD into the container sealing process. When in company with
specified sealing standards and techniques, the CSDs are said to create a "Smart
Box" that enhances container security (Jacksta 2005).
3.1.2.1.1 Issues
Some have remarked that while the CSD initiative has a general definition, it
is overall quite vague (Kulisch 2006). This perception is perhaps because the term is
used by so many in industry, including officials at CBP, while standards have not
been widely publicized.
It is said by the World Shipping Council, for instance, that "there is currently
no official definition of a CSD or its purpose," which, says the WSC, leaves the
industry unsure as to what a CSD would actually have do: "should it record opening
of one door, both doors, all-door entry?" They claim that, "there appears to be little
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interest in or benefit to commercial shippers or carriers from an RFID CSD
(Comments 2006)."
Further, the US CBP often refers to a container with a CSD as a "SmartBox,"
though it is still hard for many to discern between the terms. Perhaps offering some
explanation is Robert Bonner, CBP Commissioner, who stated that, "A Smart Box will
communicate evidence of tampering and the container security device will register
every legitimate, as well as unauthorized, opening of the container (How do you?
2003)."
Still, stakeholders complain of an inconsistent government vision. One
stated, "I have budget this year to execute Smart Box trials... [but] I do not want to
invest and install infrastructure in 2005 that is not compliant to the 2006 vision.
Therefore, I'm forced to wait (Secure 2005)."
3.1.2.2 Cargo*Mate
Project Lead: US DOT (funded)
Partners: Port of Charleston, PANYNJ; US DOD through Norfolk
Tagging Level: Conveyance (truck chassis), Container
Cargo *Mate is a DOT initiative intended to track chassis and, when loaded,
the containers that they carry as well. This system was supported by a sister project,
the Freight Information Highway (FIH) and Chassis Tracking system, which
attempted to develop standards for intermodal computer based communication.
(The Freight 2005)
The program tracked and integrated e-seals with chassis in Charleston, New
York/New Jersey, and in US Department of Defense (DOD) military operations
through Norfolk. The program was funded by the DOT Field Operations Test (FOT)
program, 2002-2003. A savings of $210.35 per container chassis was claimed by the
DOT FOT's due to increased utilization. (The Freight 2005)
3.1.2.3 Freight Information Real-Time System for Transport (FIRST)
Proiect Lead: US DOT
Partners: PANYNJ; FHWA (funding); 1-95 Corridor Coalition
(funding)
Tagging Level: Conveyance (truck chassis)
FIRST aimed to reduce terminal congestion. The approach was an IT system
that provided realtime information on traffic delays in and around the port. The
system included electronic tracking of chassis and containers in the area (The Freight
2005).
FIRST tests were conducted at the Ports of New York and New Jersey, then
went into full use there. Unfortunately, though, it has ultimately failed to raise
interest and use from the shipping community. It suffered technical problems and
security concerns on startup that discouraged users from participating. Additionally,
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it was fraught with a limited funding timeline that expired before the project's
completion, and no revenues to support it. (Petrakakos 2005)
3.1.2.4 Hazardous Materials Safety and Security
Project Lead: US DOT (funded)
Partners: US Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
Tagging Level: Container
This project intended to test a suite of technologies including asset tracking to
monitor four types of hazmat shipments: Bulk Fuel, Less-than-Truckload High Hazard,
Bulk Chemicals, and Truckload Explosives. Technologies were evaluated on
improvements to safety and security. The test includedfreight movements for both
the US Department of Energy and US Department of Defense. (The Freight 2005)
While the focus of this program was more technology-performance based
than assessing value to the supply chain, some interesting conclusions were
provided (Hazardous 2004):
" E-seals were determined to require more technical development, for
example they often had trouble communicating with the driver's in-cab
system; though over the duration of the test they had improved
* Utilization by participants of the Electronic Supply Chain Manifest was
disappointing and statistically irrelevant for the test
" Geofencing was tested twice; the participant who used it viewed it as
effective for both security and oversight for management to prevent
trucks from going where they did not want them to be
" The Remote Door Look system testing, while inconclusive due to only 16
data points, showed promise
* Positioning update frequency ranged from 17 to 70 minutes depending
on operational conditions of each participant: desired reporting
frequency for the shipper, commodity type, length of route, etc.
" Technology alone is estimated to be able to address at most one-third of
Hazmat vulnerabilities
(Hazardous 2004) also estimated the vulnerability reduction that they
believed various technology combinations provided, which is shown in Figure 3.
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Wireless Communications
+ GPS Position (base) 17% 16% 16% 12%
Driver ID +
(WC + GPS Position) 25% 25% 23% 18%
Panic Alert +
(WC + GPS Position) 27% 25% 25% 21%
Panic Alert + Remote
Vehicle Disabling + (WC 32% 32% 31% 25%
+ GPS) 1 
_ 
_ 1
Figure 3. Hazardous Material FOT estimated vulnerability reduction
(Hazardous 2004)
If a dollar value is placed on a potential attack for each possible case, the
value of these security benefits can be calculated. An example for the Bulk Fuel
scenario is provided in Figure 4.
Wireless Communication
wit GPS (baseletfcto
Ease + Panic Button 27% $995 Million 2,3:1
Remote Vehicle Disabling1
Eas m Pani Buttn + 32% $1.2O7 Billion2.:
Figure 4. Hazardous Material FOT security benefit for Bulk Fuel scenario
(Hazardous 2004)
3.1.2.5 Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS)
Proiect Lead: US DHS, Small Business Administration
Partners: iControl
Tagging Level: Container
"DHS established the three-phase MATTS program in 2003 under the
direction of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Program Agency (HSARPA).
MATTS requirements include worldwide, bi-directional, secure communications and
tracking of containersfrom the point-of-stuffing to the point-of-devanning. The
MA TTS system must also be remotely reconfigurable, low-cost, and last the life of the
container without maintenance." (iControl 2006)
MATTS consisted of "container tags, gateways, and web-based data
distribution and network operation servers (iControl 2006)." iControl handled the
technology for this project. Phase I consisted of proof-of-concept and prototype
development using existing commercial products. Phase 11 included a functional
demonstration in commercial pilot programs. Phase IlIl is intended to deploy the
MATTS system in both international and domestic routes. (iControl 2006)
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iControl goes beyond port-centric container monitoring to include road, rail,
and marine. Diane Quick, iControl's MATTS Program manager, recognizes that
"managing the supply chain is not the same as securing the supply chain... Terrorists
do not fill out manifests ... Securing populations, property, and economies requires
continuous container tracking and monitoring." (MATTS 2006)
In addition, the initiative aims to allow communication between containers
since they are typically stacked tightly together (Downey 2006).
3.1.2.6 Operation Safe Commerce
Project Lead: US TSA (funded)
Partners: US CBP/US DOT (manage)
Tagging Level: Container
Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) is a collaborative federal grant program
involving, among others, US DHS, the Officefor Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the
three largest US container port complexes, cargo and supply chain security solution
providers, shippers, carriers, terminal operators, etc. The goal of the program is to
"develop, test, and share best practices in order to improve the security of
containerized cargo movements." (Operation 2005)
OSC is DHS's primary port and cargo security initiative, and it has developed
over time into three phases. Phase I of the project involved tracking a container
movement of light bulbs from Slovakia; through Germany, through Canada, to
eventually arrive at Hillsborough, NH. (Peckenpaugh 2002) Work on this project was
carried out by the US DOT's Volpe Center, and is illustrated in Figure 5. The project
documented security practices and technologies in the supply chain and identified
vulnerabilities that existed. (Volpe 2003)
Phase II of the project examined eighteen different supply chains moving
through the three major US port complexes: Seattle/Tacoma, Los Angeles/Long
Beach, and New York/New Jersey. The project addressed container security
vulnerabilities and examined "the testing and deployment of selected technologies
and business practices to improve" supply chain security. (Operation 2005)
This phase focused on three areas (Operation 2005):
1. Reasonable Care and Due Diligence: Ensure that all parties exert reasonable
care and diligence in packing, securing and manifesting container contents.
2. Secured Data Transmission: Review various methods used to transmit data
and ensure that shipment information was complete, accurate, and secure.
3. Container Security Procedures: Take measures to test the multi-layered
security approach in technologies, business practices, and data collection.
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Figure 5. Operation Sate Commerce Phase I schematic
(Volpe 2003)
Phase IlIl of the project is still underway, though funding was available for
projects that demonstrated at least one of the following (Operation 2005):
1. Verify empty container integrity prior to stuffing.
2. Verify integrity of cargos stuffed into containers.
3. Verify and maintain integrity of the containers and cargos throughout the
supply chain.
4. Verify and maintain integrity of supply chain management information and
information systems.
5. Demonstrate and record information exchange for OSC container documents
with appropriate US CBP program requirements.
6. Test whether commercially available technologies address any of the supply
chain primary and secondary nodal goals (in the reference's Appendix B).
The port complex of Los Angeles and Long Beach ultimately was awarded the
Phase III contract, and their stated goals are to (Ports Receive 2005):
" Maintain and communicate accurate data on cargoes
" Verify that empty containers have not been tampered with before being
loaded with goods
" Verify that cargoes loaded into containers do not contain threat items
* Verify that container integrity is not breached in transit
Many in industry are optimistic about OSC, as it shows the government's
desire to find and demonstrate technology that not only improves security, but can
also be cost effective. Michael Zachary of the Port of Tacoma remarked, "our goal is
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to make sure that whatever comes out of OSC is economically and commercially
viable. That means minimal financial and operational impact to the trade. That may
be a pipe dream; we don't know." (Sowinski 2004)
The WSC generally supports the OSC as well, though was sure to raise several
issues early on that it saw of concern. WSC warned against the OSC becoming a
"forum for technology vendors." Instead, WSC supports OSC as a way to compare all
different alternatives to meet the specific security objectives. Additionally, WSC
argues that tests should not "presuppose that technology will provide superior
security" to other solutions.
3.1.2.7 Pacific Northwest Field Tests
Proiect Lead: US DOT
Partners: Ports of Seattle and Tacoma
Tagging Level: Conveyance (truck chassis), containers
The Pacific Northwest Field Tests was an initiative intended to track
containers between the US northwest ports of Seattle and Tacoma and the Canadian
border using truck transponders and web-based tracking. It was tested on the 1-5
corridor, and the containers were fitted with e-seals (The Freight 2005).
The project consists of (US-Canada 2002):
1. A northbound automated border crossing development project
2. A test of e-seals and information exchanges with port terminals
3. A southbound automated border crossing development project
The goals included improved efficiency for truckers, shippers, and
enforcement officials, plus improved compliance with Customs requirements at the
international border. (The Freight 2005)
3.1.2.8 PierPASS
Proiect Lead: Ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach
Partners: eModal, WhereNet
Tagging Level: Container
PierPASS is a program intended to relieve port congestion at the Ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach. The program implements quicker check-in using RFID tags
(WhereNet) on trucks, which are registered with eModal. The program also focuses
on moving more traffic to off-peak hours. (Truck 2006)
Since the program's inception, over 12,000 tags have been sent to road
carriers. The visibility that the system allows yard managers, "might mean that a can
doesn't miss a train." (RFID on track 2006)
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3.1.2.9 SAFE Container (SAFECON) Program
Project Lead: US CBP
Partners: n/a (still out to bid)
Tagging Level: Container
SAFECON is an effort to demonstrate complete high risk/high payoff systems
or subsystems. The goal was to succeed in a 2-5 year timeframe to create
"revolutionary rather than incremental improvements to homeland security,"
including both emerging threats and operational challenges. As of February 2007 this
project was at bid, and initial demonstrations are desired within six months after
contract award. (SAFE 2007)
Interest lies primarily in the following areas (SAFE 2007):
" Chemical party detectors
" Biological party detectors
* Explosives detection
" Advanced lightweight composites
" Detection of living persons
" Other contraband detectors
3.1.2.10 STAR BEST (Secure Trade in the APEC Region: Bangkok Efficient and
Secure Trade)
Proiect Lead: US Trade Development Agency
Partners: Port in Malaysia, Thailand; the Ports of Seattle and
Tacoma
Tagging Level: Container
STAR BEST involved "two tests that estimated the benefits to shippers of
technologies and processes designed to improve security via intermodal cargo
visibility (The Freight 2005)." Shipments were movedfrom Thailand and Malaysia
through the Ports of Seattle and Tacoma.
Results of the program suggested savings of about $400/container to
shippers, mostly in inventory reduction from better asset tracking (The Freight
2005).
3.2CARRIERS AND LOGISTICS PROVIDERS
3.2.1 Background
To attract shippers, carriers of all modes compete on many metrics, including
competitive pricing, reliable service, flexibility, supply chain visibility, and total
logistics solutions (for instance door-to-door service). This can be an incredibly
complex task as the number of shippers, origin and destination locations, and other
carrier links needed in the complete supply chain all increase.
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Competition exists both intra- and inter-modally, which creates even
stronger competition. Intra-modal competition varies, with some modes highly
fragmented and therefore highly competitive, while others have become
centralized. Inter-modal competition exists when multiple mode choices can service
the same route. For instance, the China to east-coast US trade can be serviced by
four primary options: (1) an all-water route through the Panama Canal, (2) a China to
US water route and rail transportation east, (3) a China to US water route and truck
transportation east, and (4) an all-air route. For some cargoes, mode choice may be
an apparent decision, though when it is not, service providers must compete.
Carriers ultimately must balance customer service, which they often tout as
their differentiating factor over competitors, with efficient asset utilization. This
balance is felt by any party in the supply chain that provides equipment or
infrastructure. To this end, supply chain visibility is a crucial component for carriers
for three primary reasons: to provide visibility to their customers, to provide
visibility for law enforcement, and for efficient fleet utilization. Technologies have
been applied to varying degrees to support all of these needs.
3.2.1.1 Air carriers and airports
Air cargo transport is a much higher-speed, expensive alternative to sea, rail,
or truck transport. It therefore is primarily reserved for cargo that commands a
premium for speed. Although air carriers transport the same types of cargo as other
modes, for reasons of space and weight, they do not typically use conventional sea
containers, but instead smaller, lighter, "Unit Load Devices." (Belobaba 2004)
Air cargo is generally divided into three categories (Belobaba 2004):
" Express/time definite: small packages (less than 50 kg.)
" Heavyweight freight shipments (greater than 50 kg.)
* Mail transport
Air carriers are also grouped into two primary categories (Belobaba 2004):
" All-Cargo Airlines
o Integrated Express Carriers (express/small packages; door to door
service; examples: UPS, FedEx, USPS)
o Non-integrated Freight Carriers (heavyweight freight shipments;
work with freight forwarders, etc.)
" Passenger (Combination) Airlines
o Can carry air freight, express packages and mail in passenger
aircraft belly or on "combi" aircraft
o Also can have dedicated freight aircraft
The air cargo industry is small in terms of absolute numbers of cargo carried,
but is growing rapidly, as illustrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7.
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MARKET SHARE (%), BY MODE
1980 1990 1999
Air Courier 0.2 0.3 0.4
Trucking 18.6 23.0 28.7
Rail 30.7 32.4 37.6
Other 50.5 44.4 33.4
Figure 6. Relative domestic US market share of air cargo to other modes
(Belobaba 2004)
Growth in U.S. Domestic Freight Ton-Miles by Mode: 1980-2004
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Figure 7. Domestic US air cargo industry versus other modes
(Dennis 2005)
Equipment size is also growing, as Boeing claims that, "worldwide air cargo
traffic will more than triple over the next 20 years, driving the number of airplanes in
the freighter fleet to nearly double. Wide-body freighters will come to represent a
greater share of the fleet, growing from roughly half of the fleet today to more than
60% of the fleet by 2025 (World Air 2007)." As the air cargo business expands,
operators are also integrating other modes to offer door-to-door service, as has
been done by many ocean carriers. (Belobaba 2004)
While it is clear that growth is strong, unlike the passenger air market there
is still little traffic and pricing data publically available. Instead, cargo carriers often
operate flexibly on daily or weekly demand, which complicates scheduling.
(Belobaba 2004) Scheduling is even tougher for combination carriers since they must
interact with the passenger side of the business. Historically, passenger operations
have dominated routes and revenues, although as the cargo business grows there
have been signs that this is changing. Different carriers have treated their cargo
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operations very differently, with some creating independent subsidiary companies
and others highly integrating the business into passenger operations. A looming
issue for combination carriers is the security threat that cargo poses. Just one
serious incident involving cargo, even if no passenger is affected, could generate
significant public and political scrutiny that could severely limit the ability of
combination carriers to operate. (Conway 2006)
Indeed, cargo security is already a big concern for air carriers given the
political pressure to act on security matters. There is a bill in US Congress that
proposes 100% screening of airplane cargo. Reactions are varied to this legislation.
"Auditors for [Congress] looked at what [the] proposed law ... would cost, they came
up with a final tab of $3.6 billion over 10 years." It is claimed that some companies
would not be able to cope with the cost, forcing them out of business. Still, not all in
the industry oppose 100% scanning. Olivier Bijaoui of World Flight Services says,
"the first few days would be a problem, but we would manage it. In the U.K., we
currently screen over 50 percent of American Airlines' freight because a large
portion of their freight is unknown; if required to step up to 100 percent, we could
do it." (Moorman 2007)
3.2.1.2 Ocean carriers and seaports
There are roughly 400 ocean carriers in the container business, of which
about twenty exist in the "top-tier," meaning that they command at least 2-3% of
the world's container traffic. Most top-tier carriers must offer door-to-door service
to remain competitive. They do this by maintaining large ship fleets with reliable,
typically weekly service. Many have moved their logistics service group into a
subsidiary division that treats the ship-operating division merely as a component of
the supply chain. The high fragmentation of this industry has also led to "alliances"
among many of the top-tier players that allow each one to offer a wider array of
services by sharing cargo with their fellow alliance members.
Needless to say, customer service has been a dominating driver of the
changes that have occurred within the industry. By offering integrated logistics,
cargo visibility and quality assurance have the potential to improve as shippers
should ideally need only one portal through which to monitor their cargo status. This
is one area in which ICCs could provide much more detailed information to clients
while cargo is en route.
Seaports are typically owned and managed locally, particularly in the US,
where ports are much less regulated than in many other countries (Petrakakos
2005). Ports are either "operator" or "landlord" ports, which refers to who actually
operates the terminal. In operator ports, the owner of the port manages operations,
while in a landlord ports, operations are handled by a lessee, often an ocean
carrier's subsidiary.
Most US ports are fraught with tight budgets, capacity overutilization, tough
labor relations, and ageing infrastructure. While there is a need to expand, many
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hurdles exist, including high real estate and capital construction costs,
environmental regulation, local public resistance, and local intermodal (truck and
rail) capacity limits.
With so many difficulties facing ports, ICCs may be seen as nothing more
than added cost by port operators and a threat to job security by labor. Still, some
ports have invested in ICCs to manage inventory while in the port itself. Additionally,
if ICCs improve asset utilization, it may effectively add capacity to the port, an
attractive solution to adding costly infrastructure.
3.2.1.3 Rail carriers and railyards
The North American rail industry, which is perhaps the largest and most
integrated in the world, is highly deregulated, with the vast majority of rail
infrastructure and equipment owned both by the private rail carriers and shippers.
Although there are about seven major rail carriers in the US and Canada, they are
also regional, meaning that each carrier is the dominant service provider in most of
its respective operating area. (Sussman 2000)
The rail industry maintains a fleet of rail cars specifically designed to carry
containers. Containers are loaded on the trains and then linked together in railyards,
ideally in an order that will allow for cars to be easily taken off in groups at their
destinations. Different types of container rail cars exist, the most common of which
are "double-stacked," which doubles the carrying capacity of a train over single stack
cars. Additionally, gondola (open-top) cars, tank cars, refrigerated cars, auto-rack
cars, and others are available depending on the freight type. (Sussman 2000)
For many years, bulk freight has dominated both the volume and revenue
stream for the railroad industry, namely coal, grain, and ore. Coal, for instance,
accounted for 43% of all rail in 2003. However, 2003 was also the first year that
intermodal traffic (namely container) overtook coal as the highest revenue
generator for the industry. (Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack 2006) As container traffic
continues to grow, it gains the attention of rail operators and encourages
investment in level of service increases.
ICCs for tracking have so far been implemented by several services, including
NetREDI (see 3.4.2.6.12 Steelroads' NetREDI System) and Silent Commerce (see
3.4.2.6.11 Silent Commerce).
3.2.1.4 Road carriers
Road carriers in the US range from individual truck operators to large
companies with extensive fleets. Despite the few large players, this is an extremely
fragmented industry; in 2005, there were over 600,000 registered truck operating
companies (Number of U.S. 2006).
As for technology, over the past few decades the road carrier industry has
focused on tracking tractor fleets by using GPS. Knyanesh Paktar of Schneider
International's RFID group stated that "our role is increasing visibility." (Johnson
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2005) Historically, cargo quality has also been monitored for many cargoes with
special needs, like refrigerated containers, though typically not with realtime
reporting.
A recent security issue affecting the road carrier industry is the TWIC
program being instituted by TSA (see 3.1.1.1.4 Other initiatives). This program
requires that all who enter a seaport unescorted have a TWIC card, thereby
including many road carriers since they operate to ports regularly. This has the
potential to affect these carriers both administratively and financially, as the TSA
expects the required background checks and card to cost roughly $139 per worker
(Transportation Worker 2006). For ICCs, TWIC presents the possibility of improving
custodial accountability by better associating custodians to the containers that they
transport.
3.2.1.5 Transload facilities and distribution centers
Facilities exist throughout many supply chains to handle and store inventory
as it passes through to its final destination. These facilities are utilized differently
based upon the corporate strategy of the shipper. Transload facilities and
distribution centers apply mostly to container traffic in a retail distribution system,
and are often owned or at least operated by the shipper.
Transload facilities are docking facilities typically located near a seaport or
railyard and used to strip marine containers of their contents, store them if
necessary, then reload them onto over-the-road trailers for delivery to a distribution
center. "Cross docking" occurs when inventory skips the storage phase and moves
directly from marine container to OTR trailer. This is preferable to reduce idle
inventory.
Distribution centers receive shipments from the transload facilities (or
container ports directly) and redistribute them to regional end-users, typically retail
stores, as needed.
ICCs have been proposed both to help manage incoming containers to these
facilities, or even more boldly to allow supply chains to bypass them altogether.
3.2.1.6 Container ownership and operation
The container industry is tied most closely to the ocean vessels that carry
them, since containers were first developed to speed up and reduce cost of the in-
port stevedoring process. What was once a manual effort to unload the bulk cargo
shipments delivered to ports and load them onto a ship was replaced in the mid-
1950's by containers that could quickly be loaded as a complete unit onto the ship
using a crane.
It is often suggested that an ocean carrier needs roughly three times the
number of containers than the capacity of its ship fleet since one third will be on one
shore, one third on the other, and one third on the ship itself. The carrier companies
own a bit over half of the world's estimated 13-million (Fourth 2001) strong
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container fleet, while the remainder is mostly owned by container lessors (Institute
2006).
Containers are offered in a variety of sizes and services. The most common
container today is a 40' dry container, though 20', 35', and 45' containers also exist.
Containers offer many services depending on their type, such as refrigerated (reefer)
containers, tanks, open top, flat racks, etc. (Institute 2006)
Probably the most common ICCs in use already are temperature sensors for
reefers.
3.2.1.6.1 Over the road trailers
In addition to maritime containers, there are over-the road (OTR) trailers,
which usually measure 53' long in the US. These trailers are mostly towed over the
road by tractors, but can be driven onto roll-on roll-off (RO/RO) ships for sea
transport or flatbed railcars for rail transport. Though these trailers have
considerably more volume than maritime containers (2,560ft3 for a 40' dry container
versus 3,961ft3 for a 53' trailer), they are limited in operation since they have
attached wheels and therefore cannot be stacked. While management of trailer
fleets can be complex, these fleets generally do not operate in nearly as large a
geographic region as sea containers since truck transport is usually used as a local-
distribution solution. Typically, once transport distances exceed about 400 miles,
where available, it is more economical to place cargo on a train.
3.2.2 Initiatives
3.2.2.1 Horizon Lines
Proiect Lead: Horizon Lines
Partners: Identec Solutions, Safeway Supermarket
Tagging Level: Container
Horizon Lines' subsidiary, Horizon Services Group, implemented an RFID,
event-based tracking system provided by Identec Solutions that can offer container
visibility from origin to destination. Safeway, the first customer to utilize the system,
is tracking containers as they leave DCs in Washington State, travel over sea to
Alaska DC's, and end up in to the chain's Alaska stores. The RFID system went live in
late September with 5,100 of Horizon's 7,000 cargo containers tagged. (Swedberg
2007) Horizon claims that this effort is, "the ocean carrier industry's first fully
functional end-to-end intermodal active RFID tracking solution (Forsyth 2007)."
In addition to their Alaskan efforts, Horizon has been pilot-testing RFID
tracking of pharmaceuticals entering the US from Puerto Rico. This has accompanied
the FDA's continued push for all pharmaceuticals to be tagged by 2007. (Johnson
2005)
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3.2.2.2 Tamper Resistant Embedded Controller (TREC)
Project Lead: IBM/Maersk Logistics
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
TREC is a unit mounted at a container door that is comprised of sensors,
processors, data storage, and wireless radio. The sensors can detect door openings,
light, temperature, humidity, acceleration, position (through GPS), and more.
(Schaefer 2006)
TREC transmits data realtime, and a pilot project was planned to occur in fall
of 2006. Chris Sciacca of IBM suggests that TREC will allow firms to immediately act
in response to unexpected circumstances. (Melcer and Tsadik 2006) Henrik Ramskov
of Maersk Logistics claims the TREC network can "eliminate the time lag of the
physical container status to provide real-time visibility [which allows for] truly
adaptive planning while also maintaining data quality." (IBM and Maersk 2005)
(Schaefer 2006) claims that TREC will provide three primary benefits:
1. Container Tracking Service (CTS): Real/neartime tracking and monitoring of
container shipments.
2. Container Information Service (CIS): Securely exchange container data
between parties, such as container content/manifest, location history, door
openings, environmental data, etc. Databases can also be pinged that
maintain information on the shipment.
3. Supply Chain Process Services (SCPS): Business process integration and
choreography between parties. The aim is to provide an integration platform
that parties can subscribe to and rely on, for secure mediation between all
parties.
3.3SHIPPERS
3.3.1 Background
Supply chains can be incredibly complex, and many companies no longer
view logistics as a secondary component. Instead, supply chain management can
become inherent to many companies' core operating strategy and be used
competitively. Since supply chains involve many companies as well as many parties
within the shipper's own company, coordination is key. Failure to coordinate can
lead to provincialism, or "sub-optimizing" each part of the supply chain without
regard to the rest of the system. This may ultimately lead to supply chain inefficiency
and detract from the bottom line. The cargo-centric approach that ICCs might
provide is a potential tool to mitigate this problem
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However, the way in which a supply chain is operated and the complexities
that it endures must be understood before implementation of an ICC should be
considered. (Sheffi, Resilient Enterprise 2005) discusses some common issues:
" Sourcing
o International sourcing and manufacturing: a single garment may
begin from a set of textiles procured from several companies,
then be shipped somewhere to have zipper added, shipped again
to be assembled, then finally moved to its retail location
o Dual supplier sourcing: to increase resilience, a shipper can source
both locally as well from as a distant, more cost-effective location;
normally source the majority of product from the distant location,
though maintain a small stream from the local source to maintain
production and ramp up in times of need
o Just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing: a supply chain methodology
where inventories and lead times are made as slim as possible to
reduce inventory depreciation and holding costs; this philosophy
must be embraced at all levels of an organization to work
effectively
" Inventory can be considered in one of two phases:
o Work In Progress (WIP): inventory is having value added to it
o Down time: the time in between processes
o Example: DuPont estimated that yarn takes 168 days from raw
material to consumer, though only 8 hrs of that is WIP time
" Bullwhip effect: the tendency of mild variations in ordering at the
retailer/consumer end to compound to larger variations for the supplier,
with effects continuously magnifying upstream
o Underscores the importance of continuous communication in the
supply chain (suppliers need to know why retailer is ordering
extra; does it indicate an upward trend such that the supplier
should stock more inventory, or does it merely represent a
promotion or replacement of lost/stolen goods?)
o Tighter supply chains expose quality problems more effectively
o Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) allows suppliers direct access to
the inventory on a company's shelves, and the supplier is
responsible to keep them full
* Aggregate forecasting: forecasting an aggregate of a product (for
instance, all the hats that will sell this year) is usually more accurate than
forecasting a more specific item (all red hats) since it spreads risk in the
way that managing a balanced investment portfolio does
o Postponement: by postponing a product's customization,
inventory can supply an aggregate demand, with last-minute
personalization saved until the product is near delivery
o Increase the number of personalized "built-to-order" products
45
o Option packages can provide choice while minimizing risk since it
aggregates together desired options
* Centralized inventory management: can better balance needs at different
locations
Ultimately, the many needs and goals of a supply chain rely on increasingly
improved, realtime data exchange among supply chain parties. Some supply chains,
for instance one utilizing JIT, may find ICCs a very useful tool. Several sample supply
chains are discussed below to introduce different issues facing shipper groups today,
and how ICCs may help them.
3.3.1.1 Retail
Major concerns: Inventory transparency, inventory reduction, product
obsolescence, theft prevention
Existing initiatives: Most on pallet level (notably Wal-Mart, Target)
The retail industry is one of the largest worldwide. In the United States, it is
the second largest in both number of establishments and employees, with $3.8
trillion in annual sales and 11.7% of US employment. The number of stock keeping
units (SKUs) continues to grow dramatically, which has accompanied a similar
growth in sales. (Wamba and Lefebvre 2006)
Growth in SKUs has led to the need to capture sales information that has
almost exclusively gone electronic. Manual inventories are error prone, increase
transaction costs, and can cause inventory inaccuracies. Procter & Gamble is a key
example of this, who was shown to spend between $35 and $75 to process each
customer invoice by involving numerous human interactions. (Wamba and Lefebvre
2006)
Key issues for the retail industry include product obsolescence, minimizing
inventory, international sourcing and markets, long term sales forecasting,
aggressive competition, increased cost pressure, and rise of customized demand,
among others (Wamba and Lefebvre 2006).
3.3.1.1.1 State of the art
Retail has gone to extensive lengths to incorporate tracking technology to
streamline supply chain processes and control costs. Most of this tagging has been
at the part, multi-pack, and pallet level, with little focus on containers.
To support "intra- and inter organizational business processes, decision
making, workflow management and automatic information exchange with their
supply chain partners," retailers have implemented different information
technologies, including (Wamba and Lefebvre 2006):
" Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
" Warehouse Management System (WMS)
" Transportation Management System (TMS)
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* Automatic Identification and Data Collection (AIDC)
To improve performance, retailers have also supported new customer-
focused concepts:
* Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI)
* Point of Sale (POS)
" Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR)
Retailers still focus on emerging technologies to achieve further
improvements, though many issues remain. While (Wamba and Lefebvre 2006)
claims that RFID and EPC Networks are promising, implementation hurdles such as
cost exist. For instance, (Theo 2006) claims that Wireless Sensor Networks are often
cost-effective enough to implement at the pallet level, though still too expensive at
the part level.
With regard to RFID specifically, (Rutner and Waller 2004) considers three
benefits to retailers:
1. RFID may increase the power of retailers in the supply chain relative to
suppliers.
2. RFID may reduce retailers' reliance upon suppliers for category management.
3. RFID may increase the economic power of larger retailers in supply chains as
compared to smaller retailers.
3.3.1.2 Food and grocery
Maior concerns: Product spoilage, increasing item variety, inventory
transparency, inventory reduction, tampering
Existing initiatives: Many for supply chain management designed to
streamline inventory (some discussed below); for
tracking, Safeway and Horizon Lines are tracking
containers in Pacific Northwest
The grocery retail industry faces many significant challenges: varying spoilage
and storage requirements for different goods, increasing item variety, tough price
competition from big-box retailers, and prevalence of new supply chain
management strategies.
The fruit trade exemplifies many of the spoilage issues that complicate
grocery logistics (Jedermann and Behrens 2006):
0 57.1 million tonnes of maritime reefer cargo in 2005, 56% of which were
fruit transports
0 Fruit matures during transport, making it very fragile
0 Products must be chilled between 0-15'C
* Variation in maturity: bananas have 3 weeks, strawberries have 3 days
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" Autonomous sensors cannot detect most characteristics such as firmness,
starch or sugar content, taste, color; instead these typically require
unpacking or even destructive methods
" Local freezing of freight in the container can cause significant losses
* American regulations require four temperature sensors in the container,
a "wireless sensor network [can] monitor the gradient of different
environmental parameters"
As mentioned, inventory variety has also grown, from nearly 6,000 SKUs in
the 1960s to almost 40,000 today (Wamba and Lefebvre 2006). These difficulties are
exacerbated by the fact that grocery supply chains have been found to be very
inefficient. A study in the early 1990s showed that, on average, "it took 104 days for
dry grocery products from supplier to consumer." A primary reason for this
inefficiency was provincialism of the supply chain approach: stock was pulled
through by replenishment orders for stores, while warehouse inventory was pushed
by trade promotions and forward buying practices, which emphasizes the large-
volume discounts offered by manufacturers. This difference caused substantial
inventory growth. (Prater and Frazier 2005)
Much of this issue is tied to the marketing strategy of supermarkets.
Spending on trade promotions from 1981 to 1991 were shown to increase from 34-
50% while advertising fell from 43-25%. It was argued that, if removed, this
inefficiency could save about $10bln, or 10.8% of sales turnover. Several strategies,
many of which are variations on Automatic Replenishment Programs, are being
embraced to try to ameliorate this situation. One study of nine grocery chains that
implemented an ARP-type program, Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), found that
while inventory turns decreased and levels increased, net profit margins increased
by 22%. A reason cited for the improved margin were larger volume purchases.
(Prater and Frazier 2005) Figure 8 illustrates both current and future conditions in
addition to the expected tools and techniques needed to get there.
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Figure 8. Current and possible future trends in grocery retail
(Prater and Frazier 2005)
Additionally, grocery supply chains face a liability due to the nature of the
business: selling food for the general public. Several instances have occurred with
contaminated food being sold to the market place and needing to be tracked down:
for example an E. coli breakout in Odwalla apple juice in 1996, and the more recent
E. coli breakout in spinach in 2007. In the latter example, the bar code on the bag
was used to trace the spinach back to California's Salinas Valley, though a significant
search effort for the grower then followed. Meanwhile, any spinach that could
possibly have been affected was pulled from supermarket shelves, costing the
industry up to an estimated $74 million. It has been said that RFID tracking of these
bags and the containers within which they travelled would have led investigators
much more quickly to the source, which implies that most of the spinach removed
from shelves may not have to had been. An potentially more significant scenario is if
a common food ingredient such as a stabilizer or flavor additive is found to be toxic,
where many food products could possibly be affected. These possibilities introduce
another case for tracking at both the container and item levels. (Weier 2007)
Beyond the commercial and safety complications faced by grocers, cargo
security standards for identification and screening under the 24-hour Rule has been
said to be "far too restrictive on the produce industry... Based on climate, based on
the perishable nature of products, there should be some way that [grocers should]
get some latitude here (What Regulations 2003)."
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The fragility of grocery goods, ever-increasing number of SKUs, new supply
chain approaches being implemented, food recalls, and security standards are all
factors that have been said to make "grocery ... a prime candidate for RFID
implementation." Tracking is likely to become ever more important as grocery
supply chains approach a JIT strategy. (Prater and Frazier 2005) In addition, cargo
quality may be an area in which to expand ICCs. While sensors have shown to be
limited in this application, they have only been used to monitor cargo conditions
rather than actively control them (outside of temperature). A cargo-quality control
system that, for example, responds to container conditions by introducing CO 2 to
ripen bananas while underway rather than having to unload them upon arrival into a
ripening facility, tie them up for several days, then reload and transport them to the
stores as is currently done, might lower inventory and handling costs. Admittedly,
such a move would probably introduce risk and require a very tight supply chain,
though may nevertheless be a worthwhile ICC implementation. Finally, electronic
manifesting through ICC tagging may have the potential to expedite the manifesting
requirements that add pressure to the supply chain.
3.3.1.3 Pharmaceuticals
Major concerns: Product security from tampering, cargo source
transparency, counterfeit imitations
Existing initiatives:
The pharmaceutical supply chain faces some of the typical issues that other
shippers face with regard to inventory management, although the importance of
these products adds extra, even more critical elements: ensuring product integrity,
reducing tampering, and preventing counterfeiting.
An example of the vulnerability of the pharmaceutical supply chain occurred
recently when a toxic syrup, diethylene glycol, was found in 260,000 bottles of cold
medicine to be sold in Panama. The syrup is used as a sweet-tasting, cheaper
alternative to safer syrups in various medicines, and has led to at least eight mass
poisonings over the last two decades. This batch of counterfeit glycerin was tracked
back through "three trading companies on three continents, yet not one of them
tested the syrup to confirm what was on the label. Along the way, a certificate
falsely attesting to the purity of the shipment was repeatedly altered, eliminating
the name of the manufacturer and previous owner." (Bogdanich and Hooker 2007)
In the United States, counterfeit products account for less than 1% of the
total. However, in parts of southeast Asia and Africa this number is nearly 50%.
Technologies that can track drugs from the manufacturer to the pharmacy might
provide both a proactive approach that helps ensure integrity and prevents
counterfeiting, while also improving and simplifying a common reactive approach:
the product recall. (Tiemey 2004) This opinion is supported by (Ashton 2006), who
states that "tagged packages of drugs... can now come with digital security" to
determine that a package is genuine.
50
(Tiemey 2004) raises the importance of industry participation in the
development of technologies and regulation to ensure that the peculiarities of the
industry are represented. For instance, scanning technologies must be tested to
ensure that they do not affect the quality and safety of pharmaceuticals.
Venture Development Corporation's Mike Liard sums up the outlook for the
pharmaceutical industry's possible future with RFID: "[Pharmaceuticals have] a lot
more to gain in security and safety with RFID. They can choose the high-risk, high-
value products, like Viagra, for anti-counterfeiting and safety. You can save lives with
RFID on prescription drugs. That factor added to the value proposition makes it a
[much] easier sell... We're struggling with visibility now. Next comes security, and
then quality, using RFID and sensing technology. Pharmaceuticals [are] already
ahead in these scenarios." (Navas 2004)
3.3.1.4 Hazardous Materials (HazMat) and chemicals
Maior concerns: Transport safety and accountability, theft
Existing initiatives: Dow Chemical Company
One of the key elements for hazardous material supply chains is ensuring
safety and security for customer safety, regulatory compliance, risk mitigation, and
public image.
Several regulatory bodies are involved in the transport of hazardous
materials, not the least of which is TSA. TSA has focused on potential terrorist
threats to hazardous cargoes, "especially when they sit idle and are near major
population centers." It is requiring that rail workers and shippers constantly monitor
such loads, and is also planning to require higher levels of shipment tracking and
data reporting in the near future. In addition, new handoff rules for hazardous
material receivers in 46 high-threat urban areas are planned. (Feds 2007) TSA
published a best practices guide with suggestions to meet the new standards.
Among those relating to ICCs include (Hazardous 2006):
" Use tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seals and locks on cargo
compartment openings.
" Consider using advanced technology to track or protect shipments en
route to their destinations. For example, you may wish to install tractor
and trailer anti-theft devices or use satellite tracking or surveillance
systems. As an alternative, consider frequent checks with drivers by cell
phone to ensure everything is in order.
" Install tamper-proof seals on all valves and package or container
openings.
" Implement a system for a customer to alert the shipper if a hazardous
materials shipment is not received when expected.
For these reasons and more, "the chemical industry is a natural place where
you will see supply chains implementing a mix of RFID and GPS," remarks Dan
Mullen, president at AIM Global. He goes on to say that companies are looking for
51
security and traceability. (Sullivan 2006) Indeed, hazardous material transporters are
in fact looking to ICCs solutions, among others, to improve supply chain security and
efficiency. A prominent example of these is Dow Chemical. More discussion of
hazardous material trade and Dow's approach to that is discussed in 3.3.2.2 Dow
Chemical Company.
3.3.1.5 Military
Major concerns: Immense item inventory and sourcing, highly volatile
demand, transport security, inventory transparency
Existing initiatives: US DOD Defense Logistics Agency's Automatic
Identification Technology; Cargo*Mate
The issues facing military logistics are addressed in greater detail in section
3.3.2.5 US DOD: US Defense Logistics Agency, which discusses the US's primary
military logistics effort.
3.3.2 Initiatives
Shippers are typically concerned more about their cargo than the containers
within which they travel. Therefore, their initiatives have mostly focused on tracking
levels below containers, namely pallet, multipack, and part level. Further, (White
2004) states that "smart containers" may be a misguided focus when cargo
transparency is the real goal, which would instead call for "smart cargo."
Some of the most prominent shipper initiatives are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Prominent initiatives involving shippers
Shipper Container level Pallet or below
Boeing X X
Dow X
Exel X
Intel X
Kmart X
Marks and Spencer X
Metro Group X
Safeway Supermarkets X
Scottish Courage X
Starbucks X
Tesco X
US Department of Defense X X
Wal-Mart
Woolworths X
Significant initiatives
see 3.2.2 Initiatives).
3.3.2.1 Boeing Corporation
Project Lead:
Partners:
Tagging Level:
involving containers are discussed below (for Safeway,
Boeing
Container, part
Boeing has become involved in container tracking on two fronts: as a shipper
and as a technology provider.
As a shipper, Boeing has been an active participant at conferences and in the
OSC initiative. Boeing presented at the "eyefortransport" North American Cargo
Security 2005 Forum, and argued that complying with C-TPAT makes good business
sense, is a "moral obligation," and is necessary for companies to protect their
respective brands. Boeing has also conducted e-seal tests at the request of CBP,
using both a device designed by Boeing itself as well as the CommerceGuard
(Downey 2006). This led to using smart seals, with serial numbers and manifest data
that employees check upon arrival at the warehouse, on all of its containers (Melcer
and Tsadik 2006). In addition to container tracking, Boeing and Airbus have jointly
required suppliers to use tracking tags on all aircraft parts (at the part level). (The
Freight 2005)
As a technology provider, Boeing has also participated in OSC and other
programs. Boeing is searching for commercial, off-the-shelf technology that requires
minimal customization. "What we're doing with OSC is taking a family of
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components, applying an architecture, and integrating them into and end-to-end
solution," said Mike O'Neil, Program Manager, Maritime Cargo Security Systems for
Boeing. (Sowinski 2004)
Despite Boeing's size and purported involvement, however, not much more
information than this has been found available in the public domain.
3.3.2.2 Dow Chemical Company
Proiect Lead: Dow Chemical
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (rail cars), Container
Dow Chemical, an international chemical producer and transporter, moves
more than 2 million products annually, of which 20% involves crossing an
international border. Movements are made via road, rail, ocean and other
transportation modes (Sullivan 2006). In 1995, Dow undertook a 10-year program to
improve its supply chain safety and security on a number of metrics. In 2005, it
renewed the program for another ten years, the results of which are seen in their
current efforts (Reese 2007). This renewed program is intended to increase supply
chain visibility and improve emergency preparedness and response. It should "rely on
sensor networks, global positioning systems and auto-identification technologies to
improve efficiencies and supply chain processes," claims a company executive.
(Sullivan 2006)
Dow's next supply chain strategy consists of four parts, of which the second
directly addresses an ICC solution (Reese 2007):
" Supply Chain Redesign: Reduce the number of shipments and container-
miles for highly hazardous materials
" Supply Chain Visibility: Improve visibility of shipments through
implementation of RFID and GPS technologies
* Shipping Container Design: Improve container design to prevent
tampering and to reduce the potential for chemical releases due to
accidents or security incidents
* Enhanced Collaboration: Enhance collaboration with carriers and local
communications to improve emergency preparedness and response
should a chemical release occur
Dow's program intends to combine RFID with GPS first for its rail fleet,
followed by a pilot program for intermodal containers. David Kepler, Dow's Chief
Information Officer, said that "[Dow's] experience to date has proven that enabling
technologies such as RFID will play a very important role in our supply chain
sustainability strategy by helping to provide enhanced shipment visibility and
information sharing with our supply chain partners." (Katz 2007) This is no small
task, as Dow is North America's largest bulk chemical shipper by truck and by rail,
and it owns the second-largest fleet railcars in the world, at 26,000. (Reese 2007)
Understandably, Dow is making a long-term investment, as they acknowledge that
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the pilot projects will probably take 10 years to reach their full payback potential.
(Katz 2007)
Another goal of the program is to improve emergency response through
cooperation with industry bodies. For instance, Dow is working with the Chemical
Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC), which is an emergency call center
that helps to manage immediate emergency response information for parties
involved in accidental chemical releases and clean ups. A demonstration project is
intended to improve information sharing between the two organizations. (Reese
2007)
3.3.2.3 Safeway Supermarket
Project Lead: Horizon Lines
Partners: Safeway Supermarkets
Tagging Level: Container
Safeway has jointly undertaken an initiative to track containers with Horizon
Lines. See 3.2.2.1 Horizon Lines for more information.
3.3.2.4 Starbucks Coffee Company
Project Lead: Starbucks Coffee Company
Partners: CommerceGuard
Tagging Level: Container
Starbucks installed CommerceGuards on some containers full of coffee beans
travelling from Guatemala to the US and Europe. The CommerceGuard monitors
movements and door-openings, and regularly updates users throughout the entire
shipping process. (Thomas 2006)
Starbucks and others have suggested that complying with C-TPAT makes
good business sense. In addition to being a "moral obligation," the company must
protect its brand reputation (Downey 2006). Dorothy Kim, executive vice president
of Starbucks' supply chain operations, stated that "Starbucks recognizes that
enhancing international supply chain security while reducing the risk of suspending
container traffic, contributing to real-time management and quality assurance are
necessary in order to ensure that worldwide commerce can operate in a wide range
of security conditions. We are taking a proactive approach in securing our supply
chain to ensure the safety of our customers, partners (employees), communities and
countries of origins. CommerceGuard is an enabler in helping us move towards that
goal." (Thomas 2006)
3.3.2.4.1 Result
Motivations for Starbucks included increased security, increased visibility,
and better coordination for on-time deliveries to reduce inventory (Kulisch 2006).
On the security side, during a three-month test period, the units accurately recorded
all door openings. (Thomas 2006). Additionally, humidity sensors were used with the
intention to detect and thwart stowaways.
55
What resulted, however, was a revelation that prolonged periods of high-
humidity existed for some containers. The cause of these humidity variations were
not stowaways, but in fact a supply chain bottleneck for some containers that would
wait extended periods of time in hot conditions for a ship headed to Seattle. This
quickly became a quality-assurance concern since high-humidity is not desired for
coffee beans, and a new strategy in the supply chain resulted. (Zachary 2007)
3.3.2.5 US DOD: US Defense Logistics Agency:
Proiect Lead: US Defense Logistics Agency
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container, Pallet, Part
The US Department of Defense's primary logistics provider, the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA), has received much attention for its focus on tracking
technologies, most notably RFID. The DLA supplies the military with virtually every
item and logistical need that arises, from personal care products to bulkfuels, and
from domestic bases to theatres of war. The DLA was created in 1961, has a
presence in 48 US states and 28 foreign countries, handles 5.2 million item types, and
in 2005 provided nearly $32 billion in goods and services worldwide. (DLA at a Glance
2006) To address the growing needs of cargo visibility and security, an office called
"Automatic Identification Technology" (AIT) was created within DLA to investigate
and manage its tracking technology portfolio.
The AIT office describes DOD's supply chain as shown in Figure 9.
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The GAO has considered DOD's ability to track and identify inventory a high-
risk area since at least 1990, as inventory management systems and procedures
were deemed ineffective (Better Strategic 2005). Operations Desert Storm and
Desert Shield were the US DOD's first widespread use of containers, and logistics
problems were suffered on many fronts, one significant contributor of which was
poor documentation and "no visibility," even though active RFID tracking was being
trialed at the time. Some of the results of this execution include (Burke 2006):
1. At one point, nearly 17,600 containers were unaccounted for in Saudi Arabia.
2. Accurate assessments of orders (or reorders) were nearly impossible, which
led to duplicates, hording, and inaccurate reporting to commanders.
3. The disaggregate collection of development-stage systems could not
communicate with each other.
4. A $1.2 billion discrepancy between the value of supplies shipped to the
theater and the amount acknowledged as having been received. Army
generals attributed this to poor communications, to which container tracking
can be considered a significant contributor.
Many efforts are underway at DLA to address these problems, including
better aligning supply and demand, leveraging industry capabilities, designing a best-
value IT environment, training and retaining more experienced personnel, etc.
(Defense Logistics 2007) To address visibility and accountability, however, much
focus has also been placed on improving ICCs. In the early 1990s, active RFID was
intended to provide nearly real-time, in-transit visibility of shipments for Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, though, as discussed, this was not entirely
successful. In 1997 the AIT office was formed specifically to focus on technology to
improve supply chain visibility (DOD Logistics 2007). A primary change still underway
has been the inclusion of passive RFIDs to accompany existing active RFIDs. This
change is envisioned to make inventory management more accountable, accurate,
efficient, and hands-free. Some of the specific expected visibility benefits are (Better
Strategic 2005):
1. Near real-time, in-transit visibility for all classes of supplies and materiel
2. "In the box" content-level detail for all classes of supplies and materiel
3. Quality, nonintrusive (hands-off) identification and data collection that
enables enhanced inventory management
4. Better item-level visibility. RFID tagging of DOD materiel is applicable to all
items except bulk commodities such as bulk liquids, sand, and gravel.
However, Paul Donato, a Defense Department consultant, reaffirms that
technology alone is not the solution. He states: "RFID is a data capture mechanism...
the value of RFID will not come from physics. The real value will depend on how you
create intelligence from all the data you capture." (Johnson 2005) Similarly, a GAO
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audit has called for much stronger management to accompany any new RFID
technology. Additionally, they feel that some key metrics are lacking, namely (Better
Strategic 2005):
1. General and long-term goals and objectives
2. A description of specific actions to support goals and objectives
3. Performance measures to evaluate specific actions
4. Schedules and milestones for meeting deadlines
5. Identification of total resources needed and annual cost estimates for
passive RFID implementation into the supply chain
6. Evaluation of the overall program with specific processes to allow for
adjustments and changes.
GAO also claims that, while the situation has improved, some problems have
existed in Operation Iraqi Freedom that did during the previous Iraq wars. (Better
Strategic 2005) Still, progress is evident in some of the statistics. Donato claims that
all DOD shipments from the continental US are active tagged, while passive tagging
occurs at the pallet level. He also claims that "RFID has helped with a 36% increase in
operational efficiency, while reducing wrongly routed shipments 3%." (Johnson
2005)
In addition to visibility, cargo quality and security are important issues for
DOD. A DOD "best practices" brochure discusses container seals, GPS tracking, RFID
tags, and container condition sensors (temperature, light, humidity, etc.) (Melcer
and Tsadik 2006). DOD has also taken part in several pilot programs, including the
DOT's Hazardous Material program (see 3.1.2.4 Hazardous Materials Safety and
Security).
3.41CC SOLUTION PROVIDERS
3.4.1 Background
ICC technology and service providers encompass a wide range of companies,
from container-specific veteran players to smaller start-ups to giant conglomerates.
Most have been actively engaged in marketing, industry standardization, research,
and development of their products. Most have found some shipper or niche industry
in which to test their products, however few industry-wide standards exist, and
therefore no provider, either officially or unofficially, currently dominates the
landscape.
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3.4.2 Initiatives
3.4.2.1 ARGO Tracker/EJ Brooks
Project Lead: ARGO Tracker/EJ Brooks
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container, Pallet, Multi-pack, Part
ARGO Tracker sells its ARGO Tracker Unit that is designed to remain inside a
container and transmit both location and any container data stream via cellular and
GSM networks. Common data streams offered include temperature, humidity, and
impact sensors, as well as video capture. EJ Brooks is a veteran manufacturer of seal
products for containers, truck trailers, tanker valves, and other industrial
applications.
ARGO and Brooks have developed a joint solution that combines a Brooks E-
seal and an ARGO Tracker Unit. The E-seal regularly communicates its status to the
ARGO Tracker, and effectively becomes one of the data streams received by the unit
that is transmitted via satellite to the home office. This combined service solution
can then provide tracking, cargo monitoring, and container integrity information all
in one. (Electronic 2006) (ARGO Tracker 2007)
3.4.2.2 CommerceGuard (and related projects)
3.4.2.2.1 Technical description (CommerceGuard)
Proiect Lead: GE Security, Mitsubishi Corporation, Samsung
Corporation, Siemens Building Technologies
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
CommerceGuard is a removable device primarily developed in response to
CBP's CSD initiative. Although it is primarily an e-seal, it has a port through which
additional sensors can be connected and data transferred. (CommerceGuard 2006)
3.4.2.2.2 Industry support program (International Container Security
Organization [ICSO])
Project Lead: GE, GreenLine Systems, J.P. Morgan Chase, Mitsubishi
Corporation, Siemens AG, Unisys Corporation
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
The ICSO is an industry organization developed to create industry standards
for container security devices. "ICSO intends to assist in furthering and implementing
the work of the World Customs Organization (WCO)... ICSO willfocus on defining
standards for systems and devices that detect and report in-transit container
intrusions and other irregularities (International Container 2006)."
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Pilot program (Tamper Evident Secure Container [TESC])
Prolect Lead: China International Marine Containers Group (CIMC),
Unisys
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
The TESC is a proof-of-concept demonstration for containers travelling from
China to the US utilizing CommerceGuard technology. Unisys tracked 18 GE
containersfrom Guangdong, China, which were transported to Hong Kong by truck,
loaded aboard a ship to transport them to Los Angeles/Long Beach, then trucked
again to their final destination. (GE 2005)
Unisys attempted more than 15 different security breaches in mainland
China, Hong Kong, and the United States. Twelve of the containers were not
tampered with, but Unisys conducted five scripted break-ins on the others, and one
container was opened by customs officials. (GE 2005)
3.4.2.2.4 Issues
CommerceGuard has several issues associated with it. First, CommerceGuard
does not comply with agreed-upon ISO standards for frequency that are being used
by most other technology developers, but instead has developed its own. This is in
discord with the US Port Security Bill since it calls for standards consistent with ISO,
IMO, and WCO. (Kulisch 2006)
Second, the CommerceGuard system is proprietary versus open; therefore,
all user data passes through the central CommerceGuard system, rather than
working through an open network. Therefore, the CommerceGuard system operator
would exclusively create, own, and control the global database of container readings
(Comments 2006).
Last, it has been implied that the ICSO is an extraneous standards
organization. The WSC states that the ICSO was "an unnecessary and
counterproductive initiative... inconsistent with the extensive efforts of international
ocean carriers, terminal operators and technology developers at the ISO." WSC
suggests that the ISO includes all, while the ICSO is proprietary. Further, WSC claims
that GE did not participate with ISO standards development, and therefore ICSO is
simply redundant. (Comments 2006)
3.4.2.2.5 Limitations, problems, and costs
CommerceGuard is said to be insufficient since the US Port Security Bill calls
for detection of any intrusion, not just door openings. Additionally, CBP has not
found false-positives to fall below 1% yet, which was the maximum requested.
(Kulisch 2006)
GE estimates the amortized cost of CommerceGuard to add $25/trip, which
is greater than initial estimates of less than $10/trip and $60/device. The cost of a
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3.4.2.2.3
fixed reader is said to be $1,500, and a handheld $1,000. Work is being done to
lower these costs (Kulisch 2006).
3.4.2.3 SAVI Technology
Proiect Lead: SAVI Technology [a joint venture between Savi
Technology (a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin),
Lockheed Martin, and Hutchison port holdings]
Partners:
Tagging Level: Containers
Savi Technology has installed RFID tags on containers and readers in a
worldwide network. Information is available to clients through the SaviTrak system
(SaviTrak 2006). The system is not proprietary, as it complies with ISO standards for
e-seals, and can therefore work with other systems like WhereNet (Kulisch 2006).
SAVI has used the term "SmartBox" quite frequently to describe containers
implementing its system, consistent with CBP. SAVI aims for its technology to be a
standard in the US by meeting CBP and ISO standards, and by associating its
technology with C-TPAT compliance.
3.4.2.3.1 Results
SAVI claims that their product reduces inventory, stock-outs, lead-time
variance, administrative fees, theft, and lost containers; and increases
manufacturing uptime. (Petrakakos 2005) SAVI has estimated these benefits could
number $1,200 in savings per container. (Haveman and Shatz 2006)
3.4.2.4 Sensitech (Ryan EZT, TempTale, etc.)
Proiect Lead: Sensitech
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
Sensitech sells a variety of condition monitoring and recording sensors for
containers (and a few other applications). Their products typically record
temperature data onto a paper chart that is sealed into the unit, which is broken
upon arrival by the receiver, checked, and may be filed. Ryan EZT has been in
existence for more than 80 years, and the technology is a standard in reefer shipping.
(Sensitech 2006)
3.4.2.5 WhereNet
Proiect Lead: WhereNet
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (truck chassis while in port), Containers
WhereNet provides RFID tag systems used primarily to manage containers
and conveyance equipment (tractors, chassis, etc.) in seaports or other high-density
container areas. (RFI D on track 2006) WhereNet tags are also used at some
distribution centers and warehouses.
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WhereNet is already running in ten of the thirteen terminals at the Ports of
Los Angeles and Long Beach. Further, their RFID tags have been placed on most of
the independent trucks operating in southern California, and railroads may be their
next step. It is suggested that its port terminal tags alone will "allow railroads to
accommodate annual intermodal growth of 6 to 7 percent. (RFID on track 2006)"
3.4.2.6 Other initiatives
In addition to the solutions above that are more directly related to
containers and either well underway or mature, there are other initiatives that are
considered because they fall into one or both of the following categories:
* Emerging technologies about which little information has been found
* Complementary (or potentially competitive) technologies
3.4.2.6.1 Altobridge
Proiect Lead: Altobridge
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (ship), Container
Altobridge provides satellite communication services to ships, and also allows
transmissions from containers through that system. This ultimately allows for
tracking, condition tracking, and any other relevant data. (Altobridge 2006)
3.4.2.6.2 eModal.com
Proiect Lead: eModal.com
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance, container
eModal is a single, web-based system that brings together ship and container
tracking data for the "intermodal community" (mostly truck and rail) at various
container ports around the country. The system offers detailed container, vessel, and
terminal information for the dray industry (E-Modal 2006).
3.4.2.6.3 GPS Insight
Project Lead: GPS Insight
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (truck chassis)
GPS Insight tracks tractors (and in essence trailers) using GPS units. The
tracking information provides realtime visibility to the supply chain, and also helps
with certain tasks like calculating highway mileage taxes. (GPSInsight.com 2006)
Costs total about $550 per unit plus $35 per month for the service per unit
(GPSInsight.com 2006).
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Intelli-Shield (iShield)
Project Lead: Intelli-Que
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
Intelli-Shield units are reusable e-seals with a wireless communications
network for inter-container communication (multi-hop or "Daisy Chain"). The units
also can provide quality control information and geofencing. The units can be set to
update automatically or reply when pinged. (Intelli-que 2006)
3.4.2.6.5 Lloyd's Marine Intelligence Unit
Project Lead: Lloyd's Marine Intelligence Unit
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (ship fleets)
Lloyd's Marine Intelligence Unit (MIU) is an internet portal that allows users
to track almost any vessel in the world. Information is gathered via an international
network consisting of both employed parties and "AIS readers," which are units that
read the Automatic Identification System (AIS) data put out by most ships as required
by USCG. Updates on vessel location, status, next port of destination, etc. is updated
nearly realtime, though with varying regularity. (Lloyd's 2006)
3.4.2.6.6 Par Logistics Management Systems
Project Lead: PAR LMS
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (trailers), containers
PAR LMS was created in 1998 as a result of the US DOT Cargo *Mate
initiative. PAR LMS now markets its Cargo *Mate product to track chassis for
intermodal and port efficiency management, with thousands of units having been
deployed in various ports. Additionally, its newest product, Cargo* Watch, uses "GPS,
RFID, satellite, cellular, and internet technologies to provide relevant and accurate
information on cargo, container status and security." PAR LMS regards critical that
"actionable information on asset status and location must be available, reliable, and
most importantly, affordable." (PAR LIMS 2007)
3.4.2.6.7 Polestar (Purplefinder.com)
Project Lead: Polestar
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (ship fleets)
"Pole Star's Marine Asset Tracker system (MAT) is comprised of reliable
satellite tracking hardware linked to a powerful web-based service. It provides an
effective way of automatically tracking powered and unpowered marine assets
(ships and harbor craft) in real time. (Polestar 2007 )"
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3.4.2.6.4
3.4.2.6.8 Qualcomm
Project Lead: Qualcomm
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (tractors and trailers)
Qualcomm is a large conglomerate that provides tracking services to many
industries, including road carriers. Its truck tracking solution, TrailerTRACS, is used
for both tractor and trailer management. Many services are available, including
location tracking, geofencing, tethered/untethered status updates, etc. Despite its
involvement in the global tracking market, however, Qualcomm does not yet appear
to be directly involved, at least commercially, in container tracking. (Qualcomm
2007)
3.4.2.6.9 SeeContainers
Project Lead: Hi-Tech Solutions
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
Hi-Tech's SeeContainers product is an optical-recognition product intended to
read already-existing ISO and IMO labels on containers at intermodal transfer points.
The product is an alternative to one proposed ICC benefit: the declaration of an
intermodal transfer. (SeeContainer 2006)
3.4.2.6.10 Safefreight Technology
Project Lead: Safefreight Technology
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (truck chassis)
Safefreight Technology provides fleet management solutions for road
carriers. Services include GPS tracking, geographic information systems (GIS), and
onboard sensors (Safefreight 2006).
3.4.2.6.11 Silent Commerce
Project Lead: Accenture
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (rail cars)
Accenture is adding RFID tags to rail cars for more effective management and
linking of trains in railyards. The active RFID tag solution allows for realtime tracking
of rail cars both on the track and with relation to one another in a given train. The
cargo sequencing and tracking functions then become automated. (Accenture 2006)
The Accenture tags capture certain data: wagon contents, shipping route
information, storage requirements, temperatures and other environmental
conditions.
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Stee/roads' NetREDI System
Project Lead: Steelroads (NetREDI)
Partners: North American railroads (BNSF, CN, CPR, CSX, KCS, NS,
UP, etc.)
Tagging Level: Conveyance (rail cars)
A system in use by the US rail industry to track and manage rail cars as they
are en route. Updates are typically accurate to within a few hours, as signals are sent
locally (not via satellite) from the train. (Steelroads 2006)
The rail industry has invested heavily in Automatic Equipment Identification
(AEI) technology to capture arrivals, departures, and passing points. The system
allows shippers to access position data from over 300 railroad companies in North
America (Intermodal Freight 2005) (Steelroads 2006).
3.4.2.6.13 WIPRO Wireless sensor networks
Project Lead: Wipro
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (railroad cars, truck chassis), Container
Wipro provides a wide array of wireless sensor network (WSN) solutions.
WSNs are made of many nodes and one or more gateways which centralize the data
gathered by sensor nodes. (Theo 2006) One example of Wipro's work was the
installation of nodes in conveyance equipment owned by an intermodal equipment
provider (mostly container chassis). The equipment provider desired scanning for
web-based tracking of its equipment at intermodalfacilities. (WIPRO 2006)
3.5CONSORTIUM STUDY GROUPS
3.5.1 EPCGIobal's Information Services
Project Lead: EPCGIobal
Partners: DHL, Maersk, NYK, Oracle, Savi Technology, Schenker,
Schneider National, etc.
Tagging Level: Container, Pallet (or smaller)
EPCglobal, the Electronic Product Code standards organization, ratified an
initiative to develop RFID technology standards for containers. The first phase of
tests of this technology is to track containers and "cartons" realtime between Hong
Kong and Japan using RFID. "The test matched tagged products with purchase orders
for a footwear manufacturer." (ElAmin 2007)
This first phase is intended to display interoperability among supply chain
partners, test and develop requirements for active RFID, and identify standards
opportunities for logistics, among others. (EPCglobal 2006) A second phase is to
begin in February, 2008, that is intended to track goods from Shanghai to Long
Beach and test information exchange between users for automated customs
clearance. (ElAmin 2007)
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3.4.2.6.12
3.5.2 Secure Commerce Roadmap
Project Lead: Unisys
Partners:
Tagging Level: Conveyance (railroad cars, truck chassis), Container
The Secure Commerce RoadMap is an effort by a large industry consortium,
including shippers, ports, carriers and regulators, to develop a summary and analysis
of key supply chain security issues. The report focused on various technologies and
initiatives currently being discussed about supply chain security. Specific
recommendations were developed by andfor various stakeholders in the supply
chain. (Secure 2005)
The study had many key findings regarding security, though perhaps its most
telling conclusion is evident in a graphic provided that compares the options they
evaluated and how each ranks by value to improve security and ease of
implementation. Among these options are several ICC solutions. The graphic is
provided in Figure 10.
66
Secure Commerce RoadMap
"Mi ght As Wel01 t' ft- s*e 16 OhferIlygna0
wttw *~H~fltflnm* 13 VOW
Stuffingo -it Enw-rine
that thecotan
la'd mAf e.d
* nonA<:h Deaon al roolinin
that.i s the , Sntainet in n t
* ta /Prnt i
data 
-tn ootc decisio.
thza nppcxt data picflihn,
ii . - t maAIt
EMM~~~~~i r t o- &9& 88$$10Mt l@;
Figure 10. Secure Commerce Roadmap evaluation of security options
(Secure 2005)
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3.5.3 Smart and Secure Trade Lanes
Project Lead: Strategic Council on Security Technology
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
Smart and Secure Trade Lanes (SST) is an initiative created by the Strategic
Council on Security Technology (SCST), an industry-driven consortium focused on
improving supply chain security from end-to-end, across international trade lanes
and transportation modes (Smart 2003). The SST initiative was intended to detect
tampering of containers while in transit and move them more quickly through
customs using automated tracking, detection and security technologies. (Hudson
2006)
SST members included a consortium of 65 companies that represented
shippers, carriers, port and terminal operators, service providers, and technology
providers. Additionally, organizations participated from research/academia along
with the WCO, ISO, APEC (Smart 2003). Both the EU and US government
participated, though the US's investment was described as "inexplicably modest" by
(Flynn 2004).
According to (Smart 2003), SST shall handle three fundamental capabilities:
1. Capture, store, monitor, and transmit essential data associated with
containerized cargo. This includes but is not limited to: line item manifest
data, container identification, sealing, shipper/consignee, booking, route
planning, physical status, location, origin, and bill of lading information.
2. Make the container smart: include automated anti-intrusion and tracking
sensor systems for real-time location, physical integrity and status of the
containers, including route planning, deviations from plan and tampering
events.
3. An automated end-to-end supply chain security audit trail that may be used
by the participants in the supply chain as well as international regulatory
government agencies.
3.6ACADEMIA AND RESEARCH
3.6.1 Intelligent Container initiative
Proiect Lead: University of Bremen
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
The Intelligent Container initiative is a project led by the University of
Bremen's Microsystems Center to develop a monitoring system for containerized
perishable and sensitive goods. Sensor data includes temperature, humidity and
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gaseous metabolism products like carbon dioxide and ethylene. Information is sent
to local units, then run through a quality prediction model to determine possible
quality risks. If any exist, the system sends a warning to the transport operator
(Lassek 2006) (Jedermann and Behrens 2006). To date, this has been entirely a
research effort.
The system adapts automatically to the supervision requirements of loaded
freight. It uses RFID and wireless sensor networks, with nodes automatically
identified and added to the network in an ad hoc manner.
3.6.2 NASA Automated-Tracking Transponders
Proiect Lead: NASA
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
The NASA transponder, to date purely a research effort, would be used to
monitor cargo quality and location. A transponder would store data on the cargo in
the container and respond to both local and remote inquiries. This is an end-to-end
supply chain approach, as communication is not dependent on local repeaters.
(Automated Cargo 2006)
3.6.3 Smart Technology for Environmental Safety and Knowledge
Enhancement
Project Lead: Italian Association of Regional Sciences (AISRe)
Partners:
Tagging Level: Container
This study analyzes the supply chain rather abstractly, butfocuses on how
various parties communicate with the container, and how best to coordinate them
using an ICC to mitigate environmental risk when transporting environmentally-
hazardous cargos. (Barletta 2006) To date, this has been entirely a research effort.
69
4. PROPOSED ICC BENEFITS
In this section, ICCs are classified primarily by benefit, though there is some
overlap (tracking, for instance, may support both Supply Chain Management goals as
well as Security goals). The classification used is the same as that presented in 2.2.1
By proposed benefit).
4.1SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
This section discusses ICCs that have the potential to help manage supply
chains of containers and their cargo. Technically, this refers mostly to ICCs that
electronically store and provide container information, such as the container's ten-
digit IMO identification tag number, origin, destination, manifest data, etc., and the
systems that support them.
The complexity of managing a containers is immediately evident in the
statistics involved (provided by (Secure 2005) and (Flynn 2004)):
* Average container move involves:
o 20+ "handoffs" (between custodians)
o 25-40 separate documents
o 200+ data elements
* The average container ship generates as many as 40,000 paper
documents per trip (Global 2006)
" Legal issues
o International jurisdiction
o Public/private sector integration
Many sources attempt to document the complexity of an average container
movement from one country to another involving an ocean transit. Three of these
are presented in the figures below:
" (Lake and Robinson 2005) compares the flow of goods to the flow of
custody
o Figure 11. Transfer of goods from place to place
o Figure 12. Transfer of custody from person to person
" (Intermodal Process 2006) illustrates flow of goods and information for
export and import
o Figure 13. Intermodal export custody and information flows
o Figure 14. Intermodal import custody and information flows
" (Petrakakos 2005) compares complexities of cargo flows in the US versus
rest of the world (Singapore as an example)
o Figure 15. Stakeholder interaction of export process in the US
o Figure 16. Stakeholder interaction of export process in Singapore
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Figure 11. Transfer of goods from place to place
(Lake and Robinson 2005)
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Figure 12. Transfer of custody from person to person
(Lake and Robinson 2005)
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4.1.1 Custodial transfer declaration and customs manifesting
A declaration of transfer is, or at least should, be made every time a
container changes custody. This often occurs at intermodal checkpoints like a
railyard, warehouse, or seaport. At the very least, a declaration should be known by
the sending carrier, the receiving carrier, and, if applicable, the port in which it is
occurring. The carriers then have the ability to provide supply chain visibility by
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updating the shipper and other key parties when the transfer has occurred,
including relevant government agencies at border crossings.
ICCs can act as electronic "license plates" for containers to computerize
these declaration processes that have remained manual and labor intensive in many
places. (Wamba and Lefebvre 2006) explains that RFID replaces human-to-human
with process-to-process or machine-to-machine interactions. This could reduce
cargo dwell time, labor costs, and both deliberate and accidental human mis-
recording of container movements. This may create resistance from labor, however,
as discussed in 5.6 LABOR.
Once the containers themselves are more automated, (Panagopoulos 2007)
suggests that RFID tags can create an Electronic Manifest, which could conceivably
be used by US CBP to help verify the import or export of every container. (Ashton
2006) builds on the concept more aggressively by claiming that RFID provides
"irrevocable proof that a transaction has taken place. Imagine using RFID to prove
beyond any doubt that something was shipped or received." Although "irrevocable
proof" assumes that tampering is prevented, weight is given to this argument by the
Smart and Secure Tradelanes (SST) program (see 3.5.3 Smart and Secure Trade
Lanes). In one instance, the SST system registered a container arrival automatically
that the manifest submittal (submitted by Electric Data Interchange, or EDI) to
customs indicated would not arrive for another two days (Smart 2003). In this case,
the ICC provided oversight that identified a discrepancy.
Additionally, ICCs might record and maintain different clearances that the
container receives throughout transport, for instance from a CBP party or weigh
station. The ICC can then verify this clearance during the remainder of the voyage
and potentially reduce further container inspections.
Some discord exists within the industry as to what technology should be used
and what capabilities they should provide. (Panagopoulos 2007) suggests using
Active (versus Passive) RFID tags, since only they "have adequate data storage and
include searchable data capabilities, which are essential to record an electronic
manifest, such as customs inspection." However, many sources concerned with
security argue that container tags should strictly be readable (rather than writeable)
to prevent tampering. Further, for security and simplicity purposes, containers and
their tags should keep the absolute minimum of information onboard with them.
(In-Transit 2003) emphasizes that cargo contents should not be maintained with the
container since:
1. Information on the tag is only as good as the party filling it out
2. Theft could increase if contents are known
3. The carrier and US CBP already have the shipper's cargo description anyway.
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4.1.2 Container and cargo tracking
The status of container tracking varies depending on whom one asks. (In-
Transit 2003) supports the claim that a container's location can be found through
the custodian: if the container is on the vessel, the carrier can provide the vessel's
position, as well as the container location on the vessel. Similar information can be
made available by the port, train, and truck carriers with GPS. (Sheffi, SCM Under
2001) suggests a very different view, that some logistics managers describe their
logistics system as "black hole," in that shipments disappear to the carrier until they
are delivered.
Both statements are probably true for certain supply chains, or even
different parts of a given supply chain. Tracking, where currently available, typically
utilizes information obtained at the custodial transfer locations discussed above.
Large integrated ocean carriers or 3PLs with massive logistics systems may be able
to offer this information through their website, conversely a small foreign road
carrier may know very little if anything about the container except for his/her
portion of the trip.
Clearly, there is currently no universally accepted system or practice to track
containers, which may be a missed opportunity. (Wamba and Lefebvre 2006) claims,
"product tracking... can lead to a tremendous reduction in inventory levels and
better collaboration among supply chain players." (The Electronics 2006) adds that
"information transfer ... is an area where improvements in speed, accuracy, and
visibility could result in large rewards." At the very least, with little change to the
existing supply chain operation, ICCs may be able to improve tracking in one (or
both) of two ways:
1. automate the current process by replacing existing manual systems at
custodial transfer points to track containers
2. provide realtime or near-realtime tracking information throughout entire
container voyage
Tracking can be conducted in a number of ways. GPS appears to be most
common, though a network of local sensors is also possible. In addition, an
accelerometer and gyroscope combination has been proposed to estimate location
in between updates (Quick and Tubb 2006).
4.1.2.1 Adapt to improved tracking
As with any ICC, the supply chain must adapt to fully harness the capabilities
that one focused on tracking may provide. The ability to accurately locate cargo
through a single portal may cause a paradigm shift in the management of containers
and their cargo for both carriers and shippers. Therefore, some pertinent questions
should be answered before implementing an ICC that can provide tracking benefits:
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1. How are information flows currently incorporated into decision making?
(Srinagesh 2005)
2. How does one determine which information is useful? Is it worth gathering?
(Srinagesh 2005) To whom is it useful? With what regularity is it needed
(realtime, near-realtime, only at custodial transfers)?
3. How much money can be invested in collecting the information? (Srinagesh
2005)
4. How should the supply chain structure and operating policies be changed to
make the best use of the information? (Srinagesh 2005)
4.1.2.2 Improve supply chain information prevalence and quality
Perhaps the most likely and basic benefit to implementing ICCs is to improve
information prevalence and quality.
Information prevalence is improved since the container itself can actively
alert supply chain managers of its position or any other relevant data rather than
those managers trying to follow cargo just to learn of its whereabouts. Information
quality is also improved since information in current tracking systems can be prone
to human error or inconsistency, as discussed in section 4.1.1 Custodial transfer
declaration and customs manifesting.
This notion was supported by managers from both Kroger and Albertsons
grocery chain stores. "Once accurate information is available, companies can move
from focusing on functional requirements to supply chain solutions, increasing the
visibility of the supply chain and allowing for greater control and efficiencies. (Prater
and Frazier 2005)"
4.1.2.3 Cargo-centric approach
Even in the best case tracking scenario today, cargo tracking is focused
around the carriers and custodial transfer ports in the supply chain, leaving shippers
and 3PLs in the position of having to inquire about their cargo through multiple
parties. Conversely, ICCs may make the container the center of focus. This could be
the basis to an open platform into which various parties in the supply chain may
read and write data entries about a given container movement. Ultimately, a
paradigm shift could occur from the existing reactive, custodian-centric approach, to
a proactive, cargo-centric approach.
The benefit of improving communication between parties, or "joining the
silos," should not be understated. Current standards are quite fragmented, and few
common processes or means of communication exist among the various parties,
"from the ports and airports to the shipping companies to the corporations shipping
goods to the customs and immigration bodies and port authorities ... even within
China, there isn't one custom clearance standard. We have to do one EDI for
Shanghai, and different EDI formats for Qingdao (Global 2006)." ICCs may help to
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coordinate these parties, as (Wamba and Lefebvre 2006) found that RFID with
Electronic Product Code enhances the information exchanged by different parties in
a supply chain, and in turn allows greater integration of all firms involved.
4.1.2.4 Supply chain resilience
Increased visibility and information presents the possibility of improving
supply chain resilience (Sheffi, SCM Under 2001) since quality information is
available and updated at the desired interval. Note that this is one area in which it
must be stressed that while ICCs may prove to be an essential component of an
effective supply chain upgrade, they must be accompanied by effective management
and supporting tools to make any significant impact.
Supply chain disruptions can arise from a number of sources:
" Internal disruptions
o Mechanical failure of a custodian's equipment
o Documentation error
o Cargo lost to quality failure (see section 4.1.5 Quality control)
o Desire to change destination
o Financial distress (Pickett 2003)
o Infrastructure error (both IT and non-IT) (Pickett 2003)
" External disruptions
o Port strike [consider the 2002 US west coast ILWU incident, during
which a 10-day lockout cost an estimated $10-20 billion (Rice and
Spayd 2005)]
o Terrorist attack/response to terrorist attack [9/11, for example,
caused five US Ford plants to shut down (Rice and Spayd 2005)]
o Extreme weather (earthquakes, floods, fires, etc.) (Pickett 2003)
o Supply or demand disruption
(Pickett 2003) investigated many supply chain disruption case studies and
developed from them ten recommendations to improve supply chain resilience.
Those that it is believed ICCs might support are underlined:
" Build a Resilient Culture!
* Expect to Fail
" De-centralize risk: risk can be mitigated by geographically distributing
operations, despite inefficiencies that naturally result; under both normal
and especially distressed operations, supply chain visibility is key to
managing multiple sourcing locations
" Understand the Risks Inherent to Sole-Sourcing
" Know your Supply Chain: knowledge of typical cargo conditions, flows,
and vulnerabilities throughout one's supply chain is important for a
number of reasons, not least of which is resilience; ICCs can provide
supply chain managers with both data that they are seeking and data that
may be of surprise (see the Starbucks example: 3.3.2.4.1 Result).
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" Hedge Disruption Risk with Inventory Buffers
" Develop Backup & Recovery Processes for All Data/IT Infrastructure, and
practice!
* Implement Enterprise Standards: this suggestion is geared more toward
implementing internally-consistent software solutions for all employees
of a firm, although, more generally, this supports the importance of
process and technology consistency, which a "cargo-centric" supply chain
focused around ICCs may provide
" A Flexible Supply Chain is a More Resilient Supply Chain: "Visibility is
facilitated [by employees and] supply chain management tools. In [the
Company A versus B case, Company A's] ability to quickly detect the
supply disruption allowed them to capture all of [C's] alternate
production capacity before [B] could, which put them in a much better
competitive position (Pickett 2003)." This example again emphasizes the
importance of visibility, a potential ICC benefit.
" Insure Wisely
The flexibility discussed above applies not only to external disturbances, but
can also apply to more localized ones such as cargo quality failure. Bananas meant
for a supermarket that are delayed, for instance, may be diverted to a baby-food
company that uses more ripened fruit. Alternatively, a manufacturer can be alerted
if his/her shipment of fragile goods is damaged en route to refill the order and
minimize delay to retailers (Melcer and Tsadik 2006).
Limitations to flexibility exist, however. (Srinagesh 2005) studied the
effectiveness of information flows in the supply chain by creating and running
different models. In its two-stage supplier model with a "newsvendor at each stage,"
the study found one perhaps obvious but critical restriction. The benefit afforded a
supply chain by improved information flows increases with supplier capacity, since
additional capacity is used to mitigate disruptions. Regardless of information, overly
tight capacity may not provide any flexibility, and therefore can provide little
benefit. This conclusion further supports the claim that ICCs cannot alone improve
flexibility in the supply chain.
4.1.2.5 Supply chain streamlining and asset management
Probably the most attractive end result of improved visibility to shippers and
carriers is improving asset utilization and reducing waste. Greater knowledge of
where assets are allows managers to make better decisions to manage those assets
most effectively.
For instance, (Downey 2006) suggest that ICCs may reduce the number of
touches (amount of handling) in the supply chain. It also cites a survey of the top
100 US importers and exporters that revealed that parties expect to save
$1150/container from tracking efficiencies such as reduced inventory and stock
outs.
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Once functioning properly, information-centric supply chains are seen to be
so effective that (Srinagesh 2005) proposes a study to question whether distribution
centers provide any value in these systems at all. Further, once adequate
transparency exists in a supply chain, "a company [may] reduce excess inventory
[and] take immediate action if a crucial item is delayed," said Debbie Turnbull,
program manager for supply chain security at IBM Corporation (Melcer and Tsadik
2006).
Still, not everyone agrees entirely. A study by (Fourth 2001) showed that
3PLs were hesitant to invest in ICCs as a service to their customers since "most
[shippers] want to hear about the exceptions only," i.e. when a problem arises.
However, it does go on to say that most carriers will probably build on to their
existing information systems under competitive pressure to improve visibility to
shippers.
In addition to shippers, ICCs also hold promise to benefit carriers, perhaps
even more directly. Currently, on average, containers make only 5 full trips per year.
With a tracking system, American President Line's William Hamlin guesses that could
increase to six, representing a 20% increase in asset utilization (Flynn 2004). This
does not appear to be an isolated opinion. (Fourth 2001) found that, "all in all ...
information coming from tracking ... systems is necessary for carriers to perform
good asset management and to improve service reliability." Finally, Peter Henry of
Cognizant has said, "redeployment of containers is what makes RFID attractive to
terminals... carriers [also] want redeployment. They don't know where 50% of their
containers are at any time (Johnson 2005)."
4.1.3 High-density container area management for custodian
Container management is not a trivial issue for seaports, railyards, ships or
trains. Just as focus has been placed on ICCs to manage containers throughout an
entire supply chain, ICCs also hold promise to help manage containers in high-
density areas. Probably the most significant container management effort is
experienced in seaports, however, and therefore it is the main focus of most
programs (see 3.4.2.5 WhereNet).
Managing port container inventories in ports is not only difficult, but also
suffers from underutilization of existing information in some places. For instance, as
containers are loaded aboard a ship, it is usually known which are to end up on rail
and which on truck once they reach the destination port. However, that information
is not currently being used effectively, which results in more picks (or touches, the
number of times a container is handled) (Fourth 2001). Therefore, making the shift
to a more automated process could involve ICCs that would instruct port managers
where each container needs to go as it is taken off the vessel.
(Botti 2004) investigated port container management from an IT standpoint,
and sees port management broken into many categories, though suggests four
primary ones:
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" Marine Side Interface: the loading and unloading of containers. Normally
two or three gantry cranes are used per ship
" Transfer System: transfer of containers between the apron and the
container storage yard. Yard trucks perform transports within the
terminal. Transtainers are used to pick up or to put down a container on
the storage area of the yard (see Figure 17)
* Container Storage System: allocation and control of containers in the
yard (see Figure 18)
* Land Side Interface: interactions with the land transportation modes.
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Figure 17. Simple diagram of typical container port: truck route
(Botti 2004)
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Figure 18. Simple diagram of typical container port: transtainer
(Botti 2004)
(Botti 2004) also provides some insight as to the different parties involved
with the transfer process, which further stresses the need for a container-centric
architecture accessible by all parties:
0
0
0
S
S
Ship parties determine the ships' loading/unloading sequence
Stevedore parties manage the ships' loading/unloading process
Service parties distribute the containers in the port terminal
Transtainer parties optimize the use of their machines
Gate parties interact with the land transport (1/O of containers by land)
To expand their ability in high-density container areas, ICCs also have the
potential to include a multi-hop capability, where an alert from one container can
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"hop" through other containers to communicate with the custodian. This is
important given the technology limitations of most ICC signals to penetrate multiple
containers. The custodian, then, can either find a single container or list all
containers present in a stack, which might help not only port managers, ship crews,
train operators, and railyard managers, but also US CBP to quickly scan a container
inventory to find potential problem containers.
Inter-container communication in high-density areas also has the potential
for containers to communicate with one another should the proximity of two
containers present a danger. This is discussed in 4.2.3 Safety.
4.1.4 Dray-specific applications
The dray (or road carrier) industry consists of a wide array of operators that
range in their adoption of technology from extremely automated to relying on
approximation and strict voice communications to meet customer's tracking needs
(Intermodal Freight 2005). Nevertheless, many truck carriers implemented near
realtime truck location tracking in the 1990s with two-way digital communications
and found it to be a "huge money-maker (The Freight 2005)." Some existing
applications of "intelligent truck" technology, as suggested by (GPSInsight.com
2006), are:
" Cargo location tracking (typically through tracking the tractor)
" Driver performance
o Location, speed
o Driving habits, hours, and stopped time
o Find and verify road congestion
" Conveyance performance (fuel economy, mechanical alerts)
* Asset management (chassis, tractor, trailer, etc.)
" Pay interstate trucking taxes
" Pay tolls
A US CBP report on best practices (Supply Chain Security Best 2006)
recommends these systems so that OTR trailers and trucks can be monitored during
cross-border shipments by the company headquarters. CBP also suggests a data port
through which the driver may transmit messages, which ultimately enhances the
company's ability to monitor its inbound shipments.
Since road transportation is also the only major mode that typically carries
only one (but up to three) container at a time, some unique opportunities may exist
between the tractor and container. Since weight for trucks on the highway is a
considerable concern, and can cause significant delay when required to wait for a
weigh-in, container weight could be verified and "cleared" on the ICC so that future
weigh stations can scan and pass the truck through more quickly, at its discretion.
Also, a shipper's ICC might provide verification of road toll and tax charges that they
may be assessed by the carrier.
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There are several other existing and proposed dray-specific benefits, though
most are security related and discussed throughout section 4.2 SECURITY.
4.1.5 Quality control
An often-quoted benefit of ICCs is the ability to better track container
conditions that relate to cargo quality. Common applications may include but are
not limited to:
" Temperature and humidity (conditions for perishable goods)
* Air quality (spoilage of perishable goods) (Jedermann and Behrens 2006)
" Accelerometer (tilt, shock, vibration for fragile goods)
Statistics of freight losses due to improper handling have been difficult to
obtain, likely because the number of quality control issues that could arise are as
diverse as the cargo mix itself. Therefore, the need for cargo quality control ICCs will
probably be very dependent on the individual supply chain and cargo.
Once implemented, these ICCs hold the potential to detect a cargo quality
problem and alert supply chain parties immediately so that early action can be
taken, such as replacing that container with a new order. Further, less ambiguity
should exist over liability since container custody should be lucid.
Conversely, the current practice for reefers, for example, is to record
temperature throughout the voyage on a paper that is collected upon receipt of the
shipment. While this may verify that a problem has occurred, it delays reaction and
may cloud liability.
4.2SECURITY AND SAFETY
Perhaps more than anything else, security has been a significant motivation
for ICC development in recent times. Security is of concern for two primary reasons:
cargo theft and smuggling. (van de Voort and O'Brien 2003)
Theft is costly for the entire industry, and varies by mode. Although it is
dated, Figure 19 provides statistics regarding cargo theft value by mode, and
supports the general notion that most cargo is lost while it is on the road. The
numbers in this figure are likely an underestimate since carriers are suspected of
absorbing the cost of smaller losses to avoid poor publicity. (Intermodal Cargo 1999)
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Figure 19. 1977 data on theft from various sources by value
(Intermodal Cargo 1999)
The total loss value varies by study, depending on what factor is used to
estimate unreported claims and some other factors, which results in varying trends
of estimated cargo loss, shown in
Figure 20. (Intermodal Cargo 1999)
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Figure 20. Cargo loss estimates between 1977 and 1997 (two sources)
(Intermodal Cargo 1999)
The problem of theft is particularly complicated since it is suspect that
container theft is primarily conducted as organized crime. The method by which
theft is carried out is found to be rather systematic, and criminals often "act with
apparent information about cargo manifests, suggesting that collusion is occurring
with transportation employees (Intermodal Cargo 1999)." (Greenberg 2001)
supports the claim by suggesting that most thefts are "driver give-ups," where a
driver is paid, typically $2-3 thousand to park the vehicle along a road and leave it.
Insurance rates have risen to reflect the increased risk. (Greenberg 2001) relays
statistics from insurance provider Avalon Risk Management Inc. that showed in the
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late 1990's, low target items like shampoo, tires, and books could be insured for
$0.15-$0.25 per $100 of cargo value and high-target items like consumer electronics
for $0.25-$0.35 per $100 of value. By 2001, these values increased to $0.23-$0.55
and $0.35 to $1, respectively. (Greenberg 2001)
The second main security risk is smuggling, which covers countless items, but
of greatest concern today is terrorism. While theft is a real cost borne by supply
chain participants, terrorism poses a potentially much greater societal cost, and
therefore draws a premium of investment into prevention. While it is usually
impossible to put a definitive price tag on a terrorist event, either past or expected,
some estimates provide insight: 9/11 was estimated to have cost society between
$50 and $100 billion, while a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated in the Port of
Long Beach is expected to cost in excess of $1 trillion (Meade and Molander 2006).
Therefore, while only some parties in the supply chain bear direct responsibility for
securing the cargo, security issues concern all. Among those directly affected is
labor, which, through the ILWU, has stated that "the smuggling of weapons of mass
destruction in containers through our ports is [our] worst nightmare (What
Regulations 2003)." In response, they have put forward a proposal to inspect empty
container ("empties") seals since they see empties as the most vulnerable threat
(What Regulations 2003). Clearly, the stakes are high for everyone to secure cargo.
Container security can be broken into several general responsibilities:
stuffing and sealing, for which the shipper is typically responsible (In-Transit 2003),
in-transit security, which the carriers must provide (In-Transit 2003), and oversight,
which is provided by regulators and port authorities. (Flynn 2004) supports this list,
though in place of oversight, suggests more specifically a "quick and effective
scanning system in port."
Probably the most effective strategy is one that parallels a recurring theme in
this study, that there is no single "silver bullet" approach to solve the problem.
Instead, security must be layered, with many different opportunities to foil a
criminal, none of which must be 100% effective (Flynn 2004). This layered approach
recognizes that different security measures with different capabilities and varying
success rates can collectively provide adequate security. Consider that four levels of
security that each provide a 33% chance of finding a weapon collectively provide an
81% chance. However, there are real-world limitations to this collective probability
theory that alter success rates, notably false positives (Haveman and Shatz 2006)
and the reality that failures of each security approach are not necessarily
independent, therefore the same failure may exist across all approaches.
Nevertheless, layered security is the approach accepted by most, and (Haveman and
Shatz 2006) claims that proper implementation calls for new measures in:
" intelligence
" the early provision of more and better information and documentation
about container contents
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* activating shippers, all the way up and down the chain, to greater
procedural uniformity, fastidiousness, and vigilance
* greater control and background screening of those having access to
containers and ports
* developing and installing new inspection and tracking technologies
Based on this list, ICCs alone do not appear to be a total solution to security,
but certainly could accompany others. In (The Freight 2005), US DOT focuses on five
high-level technology categories it sees as essential to enhance security, and ICCs
hold the potential to aid some of them:
1. Asset tracking: Various technologies to track trucks, containers, and cargo
2. On-board status monitoring: Monitor both vehicle and cargo conditions, and
detect tampering or intrusion.
3. Gateway facilitation: Non-intrusive inspection technologies like scanners and
RFID tags to be used at terminals, inspection stations, and border crossings
to search for contraband.
4. Freight status information: Web-based technologies to facilitate information
exchange on freight shipments and improve data flows.
5. Network status information: Cameras, road-sensors, and display technologies
monitor congestion, weather conditions, and incidents.
4.2.1 Container integrity
The protection of a container can be both active and passive. Seals, be they
manual or electronic, are an active protection to try to prevent unauthorized
container breaches, while detection sensors provide a passive solution intended to
both deter breaches and alert appropriate parties to respond.
4.2.1.1 Seals (container doors)
Container seals are intended to deter thieves and terrorists from breaking
into a container, and alert custodians or shippers that a breach has occurred.
4.2.1.1.1 Manual seal
Manual seals are already used on many containers, and come in a variety of
types. Some are merely plastic tags that provide no physical protection but do
indicate that the doors have been opened, while others physically slow or deter a
break in entirely.
The carriers support seals and enforcement of them. They have suggested
that the US government should set a date by which seals should be in place (In-
Transit 2003). This notion is supported by (Haveman and Shatz 2006): "tamperproof
locks and location trackers [come] first on every list," since they are cheaper than
sensors (see 4.2.1.2 Detection sensors (container sides and interior)), are already
proven, and have commercial benefits (see 4.1.2 Container and cargo tracking). This
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combination of seal and tracker should indicate whether the container has been
opened and where. (Haveman and Shatz 2006)
There is dissent, however. Some argue that regardless of the seal, the
container's integrity simply cannot be assured. This is in part because a seal only
ensures that a door opening is known, yet does not protect the other five sides of
the container. The goal of a criminal is to enter the container without attracting
attention, and try not to break the seal in doing so. There are several ways to do
this, and it is believed that an experienced thief can break in under 20 minutes, since
the quality of a door seal does not affect the possibility of working around it, merely
the time that it takes to do so. Finally, to complicate the problem, containers are not
as standardized as they may seem, which contributes to a lack of sealing standards
(van de Voort and O'Brien 2003).
4.2.1.1.2 Electronic seal (E-seal)
E-seals have probably received the most attention among ICCs. While at the
minimum they describe a container seal that has some electronic alert capability to
notify the custodian or shipper about a door opening, they have also been described
more generally, to include tracking capability, container quality sensors, remote
locking/unlocking ability, etc. (see 3.1.2.1 Advanced Container Security Device
(ACSD/CSD)/SmartBox).
Some of the attention that e-seals have received has been about
standardization, although two standards have resulted. The first standard, which
establishes both the technology (RFID) and two frequency bands within which to
operate (RFID gets 2006), came from ISO: "ISO 18185-4:2007 specifies requirements
for the data protection, device authentication and conformance capabilities of
electronic seals for communication to and from a seal and its associated reader (ISO
2007)." A second set of standards is being developed by the International Container
Security Organization, although this organization has been questioned by some (see
3.4.2.2.2 Industry support program (International Container Security Organization
[ICSO])).
US CBP is a strong supporter of its "Smart Box" initiative, claiming that it can
improve a company's ability to detect whether a container has been compromised
(Supply Chain Security Best 2006), though much debate still surrounds the subject.
While the World Shipping Council, for instance, supports improved risk assessment
through cargo data screening over e-seals or something similar (RFID gets 2006),
they claim to remain unconvinced that e-seals will provide any additional security
over manual seals. "An RFID device that does not impede entry but only records
whether one, or perhaps either, container door has been opened [and is] only read
by geographically fixed readers... provides questionable additional security benefits,
but would add costs of hundreds of millions... per year (Comments 2006),"
commented WSC. However, if e-seals are eventually required, WSC maintains some
specific suggestions (In-Transit 2003):
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" have unique number to be read electronically and visually
" record date when seal was activated
" record date when seal was opened
" if an RFID, operate within a single radio frequency
" read by a universal reader
" perform reliably in all environments with insignificant number of false
readings
" meet the ISO high security seal standards
" there is no need to have the container number attached to seal number
since both are in the documents
* commercial availability and low cost of units must be met
* no seal will replace scanning
Despite CBP's open support of SmartBox, Christopher Koch of WSC has said
that DHS has been hesitant to mandate e-seals because they "would require
deploying technology on a global scale... yield little useful security info, and... have
not been shown to have significant supply chain management benefits." (RFID gets
2006)
Some also note that, "until we have confidence about what's in the box ...
putting a device on the outside ... may not add much to security (Kulisch 2006)."
Every door opening may also require a search, and the most common door openings
are customs inspectors. These and other false alarms have the potential to stop
many containers, which might "be acceptable if it assured nothing bad made it into
the country, though this would not be a likely result (Kulisch 2006)." To help avoid
these false positives, some suggest adding a write capability to e-seals (Downey
2006), though it has been mentioned elsewhere that a write capability may increase
vulnerability. Finally, (Kulisch 2006) argues that an e-seal may give false sense of
security.
4.2.1.2 Detection sensors (container sides and interior)
Neither a manual or e-seal would be able to detect container breeches not
through the door. Additionally, verification of container contents is not a trivial
issue. To address these potential shortcomings, sensors to detect container integrity
and cargo contents have also been proposed.
4.2.1.2.1 Detect unauthorized container breach
While much effort has been dedicated to securing container doors using a
seal, the possibility of breaching the container in another spot, though perhaps more
difficult, is possible (Kulisch 2006). This may provide motivation for ICCs that aim to
detect any container breach. DHS's Advanced Container Security Device program
(see 3.1.2.1 Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD/CSD)/SmartBox), for
instance, calls for detecting "six-wall intrusion" and dangerous materials (Downey
2006).
87
A number of sensor types have been or may be considered to detect
container breaches, including light or infrared to detect movement, humidity to
detect a person, and even advanced composite wall materials to directly detect a
compromise of the container itself. These systems are currently very costly, and are
therefore limited to high-value goods (van de Voort and O'Brien 2003).
4.2.1.2.2 Verify container contents
One of the most significant "layers" of security is ensuring that the contents
of a container are legitimate, which includes being safe, legal, and matching what is
stated in the container's manifest. Most agree on the importance of this. Shippers
and carriers "[understand and accept that] preventing and detecting ... unlawful
nuclear or radiological material is the #1 container security priority... the industry
fully supports... piloting and examination of ... radiation and non-intrusive cargo
density screening of all containers (Comments 2006)." Further, it is quite reasonable
to believe that container manifest data describing cargo contents and source can
often be "incomplete, misleading, or outright falsified (Wamba and Lefebvre 2006)."
Despite accord over the importance of this security layer, two primary
debates exist over proper execution:
" What should be sensed?
" Where to implement the technology? Should sensors be installed in the
container itself (an ICC solution) or as a fixed scanning unit in the port?
Many possibilities exist as to "what" should be sensed that would enhance
security. While ensuring that a heat-sensitive cargo is not lost to heat damage may
clearly call for a temperature sensor, ensuring that a container does not contain
"any dangerous materials" is not quite as straight forward. Common technologies
include x-ray pictures; radiation, biological, explosive, and chemical detection; and
temperature, humidity, motion, light sensors (Haveman and Shatz 2006).
Implementation can be quite creative, too. For instance, an X-ray picture may be
taken both at the stuffing location as well as the importing location and then the
pictures compared to ensure that the contents have not been altered (Flynn 2004).
The second question of where to implement the technology, either in fixed
locations or as an ICC, tends to receive more attention. However, this is not
independent of the first question since not all ICC type sensors would work as fixed
sensors and vice versa.
(Haveman and Shatz 2006) provides support for in-container sensors,
claiming that "they should be obligatory in all containers entering US ports from
abroad." They also are included in many container security proposals, including US
CBP initiatives.
The WSC, however, has taken an opposing viewpoint. While they support
scanning technology "deployed by government inspectors at ports," they do not
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believe that sensors should be applied to world's container fleet. Some reasons
stated by the group are (In-Transit 2003):
* approximately eleven million containers around the world (versus much
smaller number of ports)
" containers pass through numerous parties who can tamper with or
disable the detector or sensor
* unclear what is to be sensed, as the list is endless (as mentioned above)
" the operational reliability of sensors is still unknown
* work is already underway on sensors and detectors for nuclear,
radiological, drugs and other substances that can be more effectively and
efficiently deployed via inspection of the container at the port
* the next step should be years, not decades away
" even if such sensors could be applied to containers, there are types of
containers on which they would be completely ineffective, such as open
tops and flat racks. Port based sensors and non-intrusive inspection
equipment is the only way to effectively address security concerns about
these kinds of shipments
" outfitting millions of containers with one or more electronic devices
would raise very substantial information system issues
Additionally, an interesting business case can be made for in-port scanners
that might not be valid for any in-container counterpart. X-ray scanners have been
shown to generate additional taxes from contraband to the point "that they can be
regarded as a profitable investment instead of a costly expenditure (van de Voort
and O'Brien 2003)."
Nevertheless, not all fixed sensors have proven overwhelming successes. In
Hong Kong, radiation sensors created, "a PR boost, but did not even try to address
the difficult, real world operational issues that, it is hoped, the next round of pilots
will address (RFID gets 2006)."
An interesting compromise has been suggested by (Guo and Fano 2005), that
just "a small percentage of 'smart' containers can provide incremental levels of
security even for their 'dumb' container counterparts." Essentially, the containers
with sensors should sense any dangerous material both inside itself and in its
vicinity. Given the frequent close proximity of high numbers of containers typical in
logistics processes, it is argued that these few containers could be sufficient to
protect the entire system.
4.2.2 Container and cargo tagging and tracking
ICCs that provide tagging and location tracking were discussed earlier with
regard to the commercial supply chain benefits that they provide. However, there
are also potential benefits to security. Several notable security benefits exist for
container tagging and tracking:
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" Geo-fencing: (preventative) ensure that container adheres to a pre-
specified route during trip to detect theft
* Proximity to custodian: (preventative) ensure that the container remains
in carrier's custody throughout trip (requires communication with
custodian's equipment)
" Locate container: (reactive) find a container of interest quickly while
underway (for law enforcement, first responders, etc.)
Currently, tracking containers is "not sufficiently transparent, i.e., the
information about what is being transported, by whom, and from where is not easy
to check (van de Voort and O'Brien 2003)." Tracking is, therefore, generally
considered overly difficult. Information flows accompanying container are also not
considered helpful, especially since "the real origin of a container can be hidden ...
with the help of corrupt officials at intermediate ports (van de Voort and O'Brien
2003)."
CBP has been a proponent of container tracking improvements. Their best
practices suggests that companies track the status of shipments worldwide. In
addition to commercial benefits, the system may reveal "unusual delays or
anomalies that may point to illegal activity (Supply Chain Security Best 2006)." If
satellite tracking is or cannot be used, CBP alternatively recommends using regular
checkpoints to update the container's location. (Supply Chain Security Best 2006)
The Smart and Secure Tradelanes program provided a proof-of-concept of
the greater capabilities that tracking provides to identify both dwell time, since
cargo at rest is at risk; and routing variability, which complicates reporting and
planning (Smart 2003). (van de Voort and O'Brien 2003) has claimed that systems
combining door-opening notification (such as those provided by an e-seal) with geo
fencing have so far shown that theft becomes virtually non-existent, and local
authorities are able to quickly respond to any remaining incident.
Still, there is much skepticism. Christopher Koch of the WSC has been critical
of companies that "attempt to create a market for RFID... by convincing the US
government they are an imperative security tool." Koch argues that technology
would provide "marginal, if any, security protection," and does not answer key
question: what is in the container? (RFID gets 2006) Additionally, concerns about
geofencing exist. (In-Transit 2003) has noted that many false alarms may occur as
routes are altered by the carrier, which introduces another question "what
constitutes being 'off route?"'
4.2.3 Safety
Containers come in a variety of types and can therefore handle a variety of
dangerous legitimate substances, from toxic to explosive. Though ICCs have the
potential to monitor cargo and alert custodians of potential dangers, there does not
appear to be very much literature dedicated to safety applications of ICCs, likely
because regulation has focused mostly on the security area in recent years.
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Nonetheless, possible ICC applications for enhancing the safety of containers
include:
* List unsafe contents and Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) both
physically and electronically
* Incompatible cargoes (those that could be dangerous if mixed; tanker
ships, for example, do not place incompatible cargoes adjacent to one
another without a cofferdam in between)
o Inter-container communication may warn of adjacent placement
of containers with incompatible cargoes
o Maintain tank cargo history to prevent incompatible cargoes from
being used in the same tank sequentially
o Detect spills that could lead to environmental pollution
* Container conditions
o Toxicity sensor in containers holding substances that could leak
o Temperature, humidity, or other environmental condition sensors
that alert custodian of potential cargo danger
" Emergency response (The Freight 2005)
o Emergency responders can be notified immediately with incident
location [there is currently no unified system for communication
with and among first responders (Canada 2005)]
o Emergency call button for truck driver (The Freight 2005)
Many of these benefits have the potential to improve container safety to the
benefit of all supply chain parties as well as the environment (Barletta 2006).
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5. ICC IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Implementation issues can vary based on many factors, such as the
technology selected, application(s) intended, funding source, project lead, relevant
regulation in place, etc.
5.1ICCS AS A SUPPLY CHAIN COMPONENT
Supply chain strategies vary greatly depending on the corporate strategies of
the parties involved, and the contributions of the ICC should reflect that. It is critical
to recognize that no ICC is likely to be a panacea. Instead, the ICC should become an
integral part of a broader system in place to address the various needs of the supply
chain.
ICCs are not likely to make a container secure, for instance, until the data
that they provide can be securely transmitted to the correct party and elicit an
appropriate response. ICCs are therefore a supplemental deterrent to a potential
terrorist or thief, not a total solution. They should accompany complementary
measures to provide a layered approach to security, since ultimately no container is
impenetrable, and it is unlikely that any sensor technology will be immune from
tampering. Similar arguments can be made for ICC benefits to tracking, safety,
quality control, and any other proposed benefit of an ICC.
One illustration of an ICC failing to integrate into the broader supply chain is
the shortcomings of RFID tracking in grocery retail. (Prater and Frazier 2005) states,
"one of the reasons for ARP (Automatic Replenishment Program, a grocer supply
chain strategy to reduce inventory) failures is the desire of grocers to continue with
forward buying practices. Research needs to be conducted to see how the use of
RFID can be integrated with forward buying if inventories are being managed by the
[distribution center]."
5.2ICC MARKETING
Different parties are interested in ICCs for different reasons. Security, for
instance, is a concern for regulators who wish to secure borders, carriers that must
comply with regulations, and shippers worried about both theft and public image (a
terrorist attack carried out by the failure of a "big-box retailer" to secure its
containers could severely tarnish its image). Tracking is of interest to these same
parties, but for different reasons. Regulators can use tracking to find a container en
route that poses a threat, carriers may wish to offer a higher level of service to their
clients, shippers might better manage their supply chains, and container owners can
manage their equipment fleet.
These examples illustrate that while few people are interested in every
service an ICC may offer (except perhaps the provider of that technology), many are
interested in at least a few. Further, with shared benefits comes the possibility of
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shared responsibility, whereby each beneficiary of a particular ICC can participate in
its funding.
IBM's Stefan Reidy, leader of the IBM Intelligent Trade Lane program,
realized this when he stated, "at the beginning, we started by focusing on security,
because that is what governments wanted. But we realized that private parties will
invest and only invest if they have an ROI and the return comes from the visibility of
the supply chain. (IBM, Maersk to equip 2005)" Carriers have emphasized the need
to clearly state ICC benefits by differentiating between security and supply-chain
goals (Downey 2006).
(van de Voort and O'Brien 2003) supports these claims with the example that
if theft is not a problem for a particular shipper or forwarder, he/she is not likely to
invest in a theft-prevention ICC. (Petrakakos 2005) discusses the efforts of various
ports, though mostly the Port of NY/NJ, to implement systems intended to reduce
congestion and improve data exchange. The report claimed that most systems failed
in part because they did not satisfy user needs to improve supply chain
management, but instead focused heavily on security. Further, they failed to provide
confidence that proprietary information would be protected. Ultimately, for any
technology implementation to be successful, all interested parties must have an
incentive to participate.
(The Freight 2005) conducted surveys to get a sense of what benefits are
important to different parties in the supply chain in four areas: efficiency, service,
compliance, and "others." While the source stresses that the surveys were
unscientific, certain trends were noted:
" Shippers gave equal weight to efficiency and service, rating them twice as
important as compliance
" Truck carriers weighted the choices relatively equally, with improving
service first
" Marine carriers and terminal operators strongly favored efficiency over
service and compliance, which was a close third
" Rail industry respondent put safety and compliance far ahead of
efficiency and service
As ICCs develop, their providers must both compete with one another as well
as defend this generally young industry. As with any product, the benefits of a
product are typically the main focus of marketing, and there appear to be three
primary models being followed to support these efforts, discussed below.
5.2.1 Model A: Specific focus with collateral benefits
A model to illustrate ICC benefits that some follow is to emphasize a key ICC
benefit, for instance tracking for the benefit of security, and treat all other aspects
as "collateral." This marketing approach may entice those interested in that key
benefit, with the versatility provided by collateral benefits as an additional selling
point. Two prominent examples of this are SAVI Technology and CommerceGuard.
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(Rice and Spayd 2005) took this approach to describe investing in supply
chain security. Since security was the key in this study, it was divided into specific
investment categories, with each benefit shown to have both direct and collateral
benefits, many of which could easily be categorized into commercial or safety
benefits. (Rice and Spayd 2005)'s categories were:
" Asset visibility and tracking
* Personnel security
" Physical security
* Standards development
* Supplier selection and investment
" Transportation and conveyance security
" Building organizational infrastructure awareness and capabilities
* Collaboration among supply chain parties
" Proactive technology investments
" Total Quality Management (TQM) investments
* Voluntary security compliance
A prominent example of this approach appears to be the ARGO/Brooks
project (see 3.4.2.1 ARGO Tracker/EJ Brooks).
5.2.2 Model B: Broad focus
Another prevailing model among the technology-provider community intent
on offering a comprehensive product, but also amongst many researchers and
academia, has been a more broad approach to introduce container technologies or
concepts that "do it all." These technologies equally stress the many benefits that
can be offered, and do not focus on any particular benefit. Two prominent examples
of this approach (although both started more as a Model A approach) are SAVI (see
3.4.2.3 SAVI Technology) and CommerceGuard (see 3.4.2.2 CommerceGuard (and
related projects)).
5.2.3 Model C: Specific focus
The last main marketing approach for ICC technologies is to focus on a
specific or small collection of benefits and not attempt to be "everything to
everyone." Most of these technologies are those that are already in use, for instance
Sensitech's Ryan EZT (see 3.4.2.4 Sensitech (Ryan EZT, TempTale, etc.)) which is
focused mostly on recording reefer temperature, and WhereNet (see 3.4.2.5
WhereNet) that is used mostly for port container management.
5.3COST ASSESSMENT
This section first presents some common cost estimates provided in the
literature, then discusses issues surrounding the assignment of cost.
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5.3.1 Estimation of cost
Perhaps the most apparent cost of developing an ICC network is the cost of
purchasing ICC units themselves. However, in reality there are many, among others:
* Infrastructure
o ICC unit purchases and installation
o Software development and installation
o Reader infrastructure
o ICC and infrastructure upkeep and replacement
" Education
o Study of system cost/benefits
o Train labor to work with system
o Cooperation with industry and regulators
* Adjustment (growing pains)
o System failures
o Premium paid for new technology
o Risk of lower level of service
" Management
o Overhead costs to manage ICC units (especially if removable)
These and other costs are all functions of the many factors, though most
considerable is probably technology choice. RFID, for instance, (Kulisch 2006)
requires "investing in a network of readers to support a tag system [which would be
a] major challenge." Conversely, a satellite-based technology may not require nearly
as much infrastructure.
Nevertheless, radio-frequency tags and readers appear to be the most
common discussed, and some literature has been dedicated to estimating their
costs. (Prater and Frazier 2005) cites that the cost of RFID tags dropped from about
US $1 per tag in 2000 to between 15 and 20 cents by 2005. When the cost drops to
around 5 cents, experts believe that demand will grow rapidly. (Karkkainen and
Holmstrom 2002) provides a similar estimate of "between $0.25 and $1.00,
depending on production volumes... The price of a reader is... $1,000." (Prater and
Frazier 2005) also suggests that Wal-Mart's RFID program could create the "Wal-
Mart effect" by putting "downward pressure on the cost of the technology."
E-seals come in several technological forms, though an often-quoted price
for a seal that is "smart" is about $25, which is supposed to last for 10 years without
needing a recharge (Haveman and Shatz 2006).
(Haveman and Shatz 2006) provides an aggregated cost, suggesting that
while cost estimates vary quite a bit, the most common value, including everything
needed for the RFID network (locks, RFID tags, sensors, etc), is $500 per container.
The amortized cost of an RFID tracking system over an expected container life of ten
years, (Flynn 2004) suggests, is $5 per shipment.
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Finally, (Panagopoulos 2007) provided some economic analysis of the STAR
BEST project. Figure 22 illustrates the trend of expected inventory cost savings per
container as a function of the container's value. Figure 22 illustrates the trend of
expected cost savings as a function of the percentage of stock outs that result in
missed sales.
Benefits vs- Value of Goods
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Figure 21. Benefit per container versus cargo value (STAR BEST project)
(Panagopoulos 2007)
Benefits vs. Stock Out Missed Sales
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Figure 22. Sample values for cost and benefit per container (STAR BEST project)
(Panagopoulos 2007)
5.3.2 Assignment of cost
Assignment of benefit has been discussed to attempt to determine
assignment of cost. These benefits are the most likely places to generate interest
enough to spur investment: "[industries] need to examine their organizations'
current business practices and identify where enhanced information and visibility
from [an ICC] would provide the biggest and fastest returns. Pilot programs would
focus on the areas of greatest opportunity (Rutner and Waller 2004)." (Petrakakos
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2005) adds the example of eModal, which was much more successful than other
similar programs (for instance FIRST) because, "it was more focused on meeting user
needs on time and cost benefits rather than satisfying government needs for
maritime homeland security."
However, sharing the cost of an ICC installation can be quite complicated
since benefits may be tough to quantify, existing equipment ownership may be
shared, and costs may arise from different sources as discussed earlier.
The more likely scenario might be that the party either required by
regulation or most enticed by benefit will make the entire investment, and then try
to share the costs with the rest of the supply chain through rates or premiums. If a
shipper chooses to finance ICCs, it must make the case to itself that the benefits will
be of enough value to its own supply chain, or alternatively engage partners to share
cost. If a carrier chooses to install ICCs, it should weigh the cost over alternatives to
meet security regulation, and perhaps study their clients' needs to find which
shippers would pay a premium for greater visibility.
Limited funding may be available from the public, most likely in the form of a
"security tax" like those assessed to airplane passengers of $20 per person.
However, the majority of the measures are likely to place cost primarily on the
shippers and carriers (van de Voort and O'Brien 2003). More conservatively, (Canada
2005) concluded that "government is not willing to share costs associated with
[ICCs], does not want to be responsible, or create a new agency for monitoring
[ICCs]." (Canada 2005) also conducted surveys to understand industry opinion on
the implications of ICC funding based on owner, shown in Figure 23. The "First
Responders" category is indicative of the report's partial focus on emergency
response.
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Scenario A:
Scenario B:
Scenario C:
Scenario D:
Scenario E:
Container owner owns/operates the intelligent container technology;
Government owns/operates the intelligent container technology;
Importer owns/operates the intelligent container technology;
Third party owns/operates the intelligent container technology;
Combination of the above.
The above table indicates that the iaoity of survycd ranked scenarios in the following order:
1. Scenario D and Scenario E "Third party owns/operates the intelligent container
technology" and "Combination", i.e. distributed responsibilities between
govemnnent and industry
2. Scenario A - Container ownei owns/opeiates the intelligent containei tecdiology
3. Scenario B - Governnent owns/operates the intelligent container technology
Figure 23. Industry surveys comparing ICC ownership preferences
(Canada 2005)
5.4STAN DARDIZATION
The ICC industry is young and standards are still developing. Standards for
ICCs are likely to come in two areas: regulation and technology.
5.4.1 Regulation
Most regulatory requirements for the transportation industry are geared
toward safety, security, and duties collection. Accordingly, government focus on ICCs
has been mostly on container security and to a lesser degree manifest verification.
However, most projects are still in the phase of conducting studies on best practices
to determine a best way forward.
As a result, despite significant talk and study over security initiatives by
government (see 3.1.2 Initiatives), few ICC (or other) standards have yet been
mandated or standardized. "Government has failed to articulate a clear vision ... 'We
are willing to invest ... into validating that our partners are secure. However, [the
government must] define these requirements. My biggest fear is that we implement
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a large project for supplier security in 2005, and the government issues new
requirements in 2006.' (Secure 2005)" These concerns over the "standards debate"
are voiced by many (Tiemey 2004).
5.4.2 Technology
In addition to regulatory standards, industry must develop technology
standards for performance, capabilities, and communication. This difficulty is
exacerbated by the regulatory standards issues discussed above: without clear
definitions and requirements, technology does not have a universal set of goals.
Probably the most work that has been done to standardize technology is the
ISO effort to standardize e-seals (see 4.2.1.1.2 Electronic seal (E-seal)).
In addition, EPCglobal has begun testing its EPCIS system that has the
possibility to help integrate container and part tracking to existing EPC systems (see
3.5.1 EPCGlobal's Information Services).
5.5 LIABILITY
Information added to the supply chain presents several new liabilities,
perhaps the greatest of which is the protection of proprietary data. While an ICC
benefit continuously mentioned is the electronic collection and transmission of data
that may introduce vast efficiencies, it also opens the possibility of proprietary data
interception. The first aspect of this concern is specific to technology providers that
require clients to use their specific network (for instance CommerceGuard), thereby
increasing the possibility of a leak. It is instead "better to have [an] open network of
competitors amongst which data can flow directly between parties (Kulisch 2006)."
The second aspect of this concern is on the physical side, that data stored on the
container traveling around the world may be very vulnerable "and hence must be
secured (Schaefer 2006)." This refers both to proprietary data leakage as well as
tampering to falsify information, which must be prevented and/or detected (Kulisch
2006). These added liabilities were some of the primary concerns that prevented
stakeholders from sharing information in one pilot project, FIRST (see 3.1.2.3 Freight
Information Real-Time System for Transport (FIRST)) (Petrakakos 2005).
Another set of liability issues arise from greater data availability: how to
respond to alerts. What procedure would be in place should an alert be sent that
indicates radiological material is aboard a ship coming to port? Would this require
the ship to stop well outside the port to be inspected by US Coast Guard and other
officials? Since several legitimate cargoes (like granite) might set off these alarms,
can false alerts be verified? Once an intrusion is detected, does the carrier bear
responsibility to intercept (In-Transit 2003)? Less grave than terrorism but very
important still are cargo quality sensors that may be seen by carriers only as a way
for shippers to assess blame, and therefore are quite unattractive. Once these
questions are addressed, the threat of false positives could still put a significant
operating burden on shippers and carriers.
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Needless to say, while ICCs may appear an excellent way to expedite many
processes by some, they might also be seen as nothing more than a liability by
others.
5.6 LABOR
ICCs have the potential to streamline the supply chain by automating many
processes that are currently manual. Therefore, it has been seen as a potential
threat by labor, which is highly organized in North America through the International
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and to varying degrees throughout the rest
of the world. ILWU officials have said that while they are not opposed to new
technology, they would want members retrained and jobs kept on site. Steve
Stallone, a union spokesperson, is clear about their position: "The ILWU is a group
that takes care of its own. We want to make sure that the jobs that are controlled by
and are traditionally the union's, remain union jobs." (Nero 2002) Therefore, any ICC
discussions must include labor so as to avoid possible conflicts.
5.71CC LOGISTICS
If ICCs are to be implemented, a choice must be made whether to make the
onboard technology permanent or removable.
If made permanent, the container might demand a premium as would a
reefer or any other type of specialized container. Therefore, it should only carry
cargo that utilizes the ICC to collect that premium, which may fundamentally change
(and limit) the container's logistics. Additionally, ownership of a container is
traditionally limited to one party, which may complicate funding if anyone other
than the container owner intends to participate in funding the ICC.
If made removable, then flexibility may be gained, but the ICC units will
require a separate, "sub" supply chain that needs to be managed separately of both
the main cargo supply chain and the existing container supply chain.
5.8PATH TO IMPLEMENTATION
Implementation must address the items already discussed and perhaps
more, though some sources have discussed implementation specifically. (The Freight
2005), for instance, presents a detailed list of implementation triggers:
1. Pursuit of competitive advantage: likely to be the main trigger for as market
leaders seek to improve their standing and profitability
2. Keeping up with competitors: catalyst for market followers. Success by
market leaders progressively erases doubt and skepticism
3. Compliance: either commercial or regulatory. Commercial compliance arises
when customers demand innovation. Regulatory compliance is self
explanatory.
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Additionally, (The Freight 2005) provides several implementation barriers:
" Skepticism about efficacy is the fundamental concern.
" Immature standards can deprive vendors and users of a common and fair
template for deployment.
" Concerns about negative operational impacts, such as the need to
replace batteries in the field, may mobilize opposition from service
providers.
" The credibility of the business case is often the dominant concern, with
the strongest skepticism reserved for estimates of benefits.
" Exposure to government actions or inaction adds barriers to some
intelligent freight projects that depend on government funding to deploy
common infrastructure or affects decisions on which path to take.
" Concerns about the loss of proprietary information may keep some firms
from committing to new technologies and networks.
(Jedermann and Behrens 2006) has proposed that ICCs will likely be
implemented through three successive generations:
1. Only read measurement at end of transport. This does not comply with JIT.
2. "On the road" access to sensor data.
3. A final generation characterized by:
a. Autonomous configuration
b. On-the-road sensor access
c. Autonomous assessment and decision making
Currently, (Mary and Lee 2005) argues that RFID is mostly in a "replacement"
phase, as it is simply replacing barcodes and is "not creating anything new except for
that it is easier to use." This is consistent with the first phase above.
Though discussions in this report are all at a fairly high-level, if ICCs arrive, it
will be as initiative-by-initiative, which will in turn require many companies to
conduct their own assessment comparing various ICC options as well as alternative
solutions to meet their specific supply chain needs. If an ICC solution is chosen, it will
have to demonstrate that it really can, as Patrick Connaughton of Forrester Research
Inc. puts it, "really drive top-line growth." (Katz 2007)
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The Intelligent Container Concept will inevitably mean different things to
different parties. Opinions currently vary widely on proposed benefits, their
relevance to the supply chain, and whether they can outweigh costs. As can be
expected, technology providers are ambitious about new technologies. Carriers have
actively participated as well, and have supported much of the regulation that has
been put forward, though they tend to be more conservative (or pragmatic) about
new technologies. Shippers have demonstrated different levels of interest in ICCs
depending on the size of, nature of, and relevant regulations affecting their
respective supply chains. Finally, regulatory bodies have been under scrutiny from
everyone, including Congress, the general public, and virtually every affected party
in the supply chain to move forward with initiatives, and they have.
A wide variety of benefits have been proposed, though each one has fallen
into one of two general categories: Supply Chain Management, a direct commercial
benefit; or Security and Safety, typically a required investment that is essentially
insurance. These benefits are crucial to determine and evaluate since, despite the
hype and elegance of new technology, ICCs will probably only be successful if they
provide sufficient value to the supply chain, either directly or as mitigated risk. Since
shippers and carriers are likely to bear the brunt of the direct costs, it is especially
important to make these benefits clear to them. This is not always done, as Eric
Mensing of APL Logistics demonstrates in his assertion that technology vendors are
"finding problems for their technologies" rather than the other way around
(Moorman 2007).
In fact, there is an incredible diversity of needs among different parties,
which should be the primary focus of ICC developers. Truck carriers must manage
growing tractor fleets, Starbucks must protect its containers from stowaways, ports
must manage ever more containers, grocery retailers must prevent spoilage, Wal-
Mart must track and account for ever more SKUs, and Maersk Line must administer
over a million containers (Maersk 2007) while providing flexibility to their
customers. Many initiatives, particularly those that are already commercially
successful, focused on only one or two of these specific needs each. That degree of
specialization attests to the fact that, currently, there are no "one size fits all"
solutions, and any vendor intending to provide one must make it incredibly
adaptable so that the required performance can be achieved without excess "bells
and whistles" that would equate to over-engineering.
That all having been said, there certainly is room for innovation that will not
only support stated needs, but also create new possibilities never before considered.
Without complete supply chain visibility, for instance, most supply chain managers
may not have considered inventory pooling with other shippers. Therefore, nor
would have the carriers or 3PLs prepared themselves to deal with the excessive re-
routings that might result. In another example, some have suggested that ICCs could
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allow managers to remove entire portions of the supply chain, namely distribution
centers. These changes are fundamental changes to the way in which the system
currently operates.
The fragmentation and varying needs within industry make continued and
improved collaboration crucial to developing clear baseline goals. Collaboration is
needed now in the early phases of research to understand each party's particular
issues. It will be needed as trials take place to share best practices. It will eventually
be needed to determine ownership of new infrastructure, especially given the
ownership arrangements of existing infrastructure, where, for instance, containers,
trailers, and other assets are typically owned by either the carriers or an
independent party.
Collaboration will also be needed to provide coherent and consistent
comment to regulators as standards are developed, which raises the parallel issue of
collaboration on the public side. While "the government" may be referred to as a
single entity, in reality it is an incredibly diverse set of bodies that support different
aspects of the nation's transportation system. For instance, before September 11,
"fourteen agencies [had] a role in port security, but not one counted it as its top
mission (Peckenpaugh 2002)." This fragmentation has led to many public initiatives
that, even when lauded on their own as being effective, have not been put into the
context of a clear overall strategy. This lack of strategy has, in turn, been a large
hurdle for the private sector to develop its own strategy.
Last, but certainly not least, it is important to reiterate one last time that ICCs
should not act in isolation, but instead accompany and support other technologies,
methods, and the overall supply chain strategy that it serves. Indeed, many
implementation plans described in this study take entire supply chain approaches,
often with ICCs contributing to portions of it, but few if any have shown it as a sole
solution. Failure to properly integrate ICCs has also already been shown to have
prevented past initiatives from succeeding.
Despite all of the hurdles, though, ICCs are in a favorable position. As
companies increasingly compete through their supply chains by balancing lean
principles with resiliency, a variety of possible solutions, including ICCs, are on the
table. Additionally, recent supply chain disruptions of various origins have brought
Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) to executive-level attention. One report
notes that 54% of the 89 executives surveyed said that their companies planned to
increase spending on SCRM in the following year. (Reese 2007) Combined with
regulation, these commercial factors are likely to spur ever more focus on improved
supply chain strategies, of which intelligent container concepts could become a
central and critical component.
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